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Abstract
Modernizing airfield damage assessment has long been a priority mission at the
Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC). Previously, AFCEC has made advances to
expedite unexploded ordnance (UXO) neutralization and pavement repair. Missing from
these initiatives is the initial assessment component. This thesis expands the idea of
using Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS), applies it to the Air Force mission, and
provides SUAS vehicle configuration and sensor recommendations.
In this study, 25 civil engineer officers reviewed airfield imagery gathered using
two small air vehicles. For the first review, participants attempted to identify UXOs and
foreign object debris (FOD) in a computer interface that leverages images collected by a
fixed-wing air vehicle. The second review uses a two-dimensional map created using a
hex-rotor. The results of both systems were then compared to the status quo. Resulting
statistics indicate that, irrespective of image resolution, additional analysis time does not
result in greater object detection or correct identification.
Overall, this thesis concludes that SUAS use for afield damage assessment shows
promise. Moreover, they can provide the Air Force improved precision for locating
UXOs and FOD, as well as estimate dimensions of damage. Dedicating resources to
developing this technology will also assist with improving object detection and
manpower efficiency. Further research is required for optimal image characterization
requisite for reducing and/or eliminating the occurrence of false negative events.
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LEVERAGING UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS TO MODERNIZE AIRFIELD
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
I. Introduction

“It is only through labor and painful effort; by grim energy and resolute courage; that
we move on to better things” – Theodore Roosevelt

Airfields are the predominant medium through which personnel, equipment, and
supplies are transported to and from United States military installations worldwide. In the
pre-attack status, airfields serve as a conveyor of personnel and supplies to various theaters
of operation as well as provide the medium for aviators to refine their skills. In the postattack condition, airfields must be able to launch and recover aircraft to respond to mission
requirements and continue facilitating global operations. In today’s United States Air
Force, active duty personnel number 200,000 less than the start of the Gulf War (Losey,
2016). This reduction in airmen reduces targeted installations’ or neighboring mission
partners’ ability to respond and execute recovery measures. Thus, compared to the air
force of 30 years ago, an incapacitated airfield represents a significantly greater
degradation in the ability to respond to threats and continue sustainment, humanitarian, and
contingency operations, both at home and abroad.
“If an enemy attacks an airbase [whether that be through kinetic or nonconventional
means], the [installation] commander’s immediate problem is to launch and recover
mission aircraft as soon as possible” (Air Force Civil Engineer Center, 2015b).” As such,
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the Base Civil Engineer (BCE) is responsible for responding to these events and are
charged with the mission to expediently identify airfield infrastructure damage and
recommend the most efficient repair solution.
General Issue
In its current expression, the conventional methods employed to assess and repair
airfield damage has – for the most part – relied upon the same procedures as when military
aviation was newly minted. Recent improvements have been realized in the means by
which debris and live munitions are cleared. Further, the filling and repair of craters has
become more time and resource efficient. However, the method by which airfields are
assessed for Foreign Object Debris (FOD), Unexploded Ordnance (UXOs), and damage
has largely remained unchanged over the course of the past century.
What this undertaking entails is a dangerous and potentially inaccurate manual
effort that consumes time and manpower resources proportional to the size of the airfield
and servicing installation. Since the first grassy field in Dearborn, Michigan, was fortified
with concrete in 1928 (“First Concrete Runway - Ford Field - Dearborn, MI,” 2016), FOD
walks and damage assessments have been carried out manually, requiring personnel to
physically examine the length of each and every runway, taxiway, and parking apron to
characterize the operating surface’s readiness to launch and recover aircraft. In the postattack condition, this process places troops in harm’s way, whether it be secondary
bombardment, detonating UXOs, or venturing into a Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
or Nuclear (CBRN) environment. In the year 2017, this approach to appraising airfields
remains the same; there must be a better, safer, more efficient way.
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Background
Upon completion of a successful airfield damage assessment, a series of Minimum
Operating Strip (MOS) solutions will be identified as well as which taxiways and parking
aprons require repair. A MOS is “the smallest amount of area that must be repaired to
launch and recover aircraft” (Department of Defense, 2002). When the MOS is combined
with the adjoining access taxiways and relevant parking aprons, the collective area is
referred to as the Minimum Airfield Operating Surface (MAOS) (Air Force Civil Engineer
Center, 2015a). Prior to the determination of the placement of a MOS and/or MAOS, an
assessment of airfield infrastructure must be undertaken to identify the presence and
location of physical damage and debris, as well as to identify UXOs that are present on the
airfield surfaces.
The Installation Control Center (ICC) provides operational and environmental
requirements as well as expected operating conditions following the attack. Armed with
this information, the MOS selection team locates potential operating strips to be repaired
and recommends MOS candidates, as well as an overall MAOS to the ICC commander.
Once approved, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) director orchestrates the
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams as they neutralize and clear areas identified as
containing UXOs and other kinetic hazards. Finally, the Airfield Damage Repair (ADR)
teams begin their crater and spall clearing and repair activities.
In general, from the instance that the attack condition expires and the ICC
commander issues the “all-clear,” the BCE’s objective is to resume flying operations within
4 hours by “providing an accessible and functional MOS/MAOS that will sustain 100
passes of the particular aircraft identified by the ICC at its projected mission weight, or the
3

number of passes required to support the initial surge mission aircraft” (Air Force Civil
Engineer Center, 2015a; Department of Defense, 2002). Depending on the aircraft type
and operational requirements, repairs may require more time due to greater MOS width
and length requirements in relation to the number of UXOs and craters identified.
Through their efforts to modernize and expedite ADR, the Air Force Civil Engineer
Center (AFCEC) has improved the Air Force’s capability to expediently repair airfield
damage. For instance, the R-1 Vehicle and Equipment Set enables three ADR teams to
repair three (one each) 50-foot bomb craters with an AM-2 or Folded Fiberglass Mat (FFM)
within 4 hours. Additional kits include the R-2 and R-3 Vehicle and Equipment Set
Additives. The R-2 provides additional tools, equipment, and supplies, whereas the R-3 is
an abbreviated version of the R-2. Refer to Appendix A. R-1, R-2, and R-3 Vehicle and
Equipment Sets for information regarding the R-1, R-2, and R-3 vehicle and equipment
sets. When used in combination, the R-1, R-2, and R-3 kits allow six ADR teams – three
on the MOS and three on the taxiways – to repair two 50-foot craters each, for a total of
twelve 50-foot bomb craters within 4 hours. By comparison, traditional methods require
excavation, concrete cutting, backfilling, compacting, and flowing fresh concrete, all of
which are present in the R-kits. However, due to concrete strength requirements, legacy
repair times lasted weeks. Moreover, with the inclusion of freezing temperatures and
precipitation, large area repairs could take months to fully cure (Duncan, 2007).
AFCEC’s efforts to expedite airfield recovery operations have improved
turnaround time to restore an airfield. However, these improvements only address the
reconstitution and repair functions. The damage assessment component poses an open
opportunity to even further improve this process (Figure 1). Areas in which the assessment
4

phase may be improved include 1) reduction in the amount of time required to examine the
airfield surfaces, 2) the precision and accuracy experienced in quantifying and
characterizing damage and UXOs, 3) reduction in manpower and equipment resources
employed throughout the damage assessment phase, and 4) mitigation of the threat posed
to human life.

Figure 1. Airfield Recovery Cycle

With the recent advances in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (SUAS) technologies, new capabilities have emerged that may render the
post-attack inspection safer – from a manpower perspective – more accurate, and more
time and resources efficient. Ultimately, an investigation of this technology is necessary
to support the use of SUAS technologies during the assessment of runways and associated
spaces to facilitate the mobilization of Civil Engineer resources.
Problem Statement
The inspection and assessment of a runway, and associated spaces, following
conventional and nonconventional attacks is a time-consuming and manpower-intensive
undertaking. The efficiency of the airfield damage assessment process ultimately impacts
the ability of civil engineer repair teams to meet repair criteria established in Air Force
Pamphlet (AFPAM) 10-219, Volume 4 (Air Force Civil Engineer Center, 2015a). The
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initial reconnaissance and assessment are the first steps in recovering the installation and
enabling the generation and recovery of aircraft sorties. As such, it is essential that
techniques that facilitate expediting the post-attack assessment process are investigated.
Improvements to the post-attack assessment process can yield direct benefits to mission
readiness restoration.
From the installation commander’s issuance of limited release of recovery
personnel to the mobilization of repair resources, 90 minutes have been allocated as a
threshold for this task. This is based on the 4-hour repair criteria established in AFPAM
10-219, Volume 4, and the time necessary to complete repairs. This phase must produce
precise assessment data that supports the immediate deployment of civil engineer repair
teams. In addition, the assessment data must provide actionable information for clearing
UXOs and debris, repairing damage, and establishing the MOS and/or MAOS.
Research Objective
The outcome of this thesis is to analyze and demonstrate that an SUAS approach –
at a relatively low price point – is capable of meeting Air Force Civil Engineer
requirements for the survey and assessment of airfield pavements in the post-attack
condition. Moreover, it also demonstrates that the employment of SUAS can successfully
identify, geo-locate, and classify airfield damage and UXOs, as well as serve to reduce
manpower requirements for conducting damage and hazard reconnaissance following an
attack.

6

Investigative Questions.
Each of the following investigative questions address one of the three major focus
areas of SUAS design and employment which include: 1) SUAS employment efficacy, 2)
resource requirements, and 3) sensor packages, vehicle characteristics, and airfield damage
assessment specific optimization.
1. Are civil engineer personnel capable of reliably leveraging data collected via
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) to meet or exceed traditional damage
assessment methods?
2. What are the resource requirements – e.g. manpower, purchase costs,
consumables, etc. – for an SUAS concept to accomplish an airfield damage
assessment?
3. Given the target criteria specified in the problem statement, what sensor
packages, aerial vehicle characteristics, and environmental optimization
considerations are appropriate for conducting airfield damage assessments?
Scope, Assumptions, and Limitations.
This thesis focuses on pre-existing airfield images that were collected from two
different air vehicles with distinct imaging platforms. Refer to Chapter III and Appendix
I. Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Components for full air vehicle configuration
information. Therefore, the data used in this thesis is limited to the environmental
conditions present on the day the data was collected. This includes 1) fair weather, absent
precipitation or extreme heat/cold and low-wind periods, and 2) daylight operations. In
addition, configuration limitations excluded sensor packages beyond image capturing
techniques, such as LIDAR, Infrared, Sonar, etc., as well as data processing algorithms or
7

artificial intelligence. Lastly, data supporting improvements to personnel safety through
the employment of SUAS technologies was not collected in this thesis. Any threat
mitigation conclusions are purely speculative in nature.
Overview
In the following chapter, a literature search is provided to demonstrate the body of
knowledge – as of this writing – pertaining the state-of-the-art in terms of SUAS and what
it has to offer Air Force airfield damage assessment. In addition, multiple applications of
SUAS employment in related fields are described. In Chapter III, the approach to test the
existing dataset by using 1) baseline metrics established from enlisted civil engineer airmen
whose profession it is to conduct airfield damage assessments and 2) civil engineer officers
to analyze the pre-existing dataset and compare performance levels across the baseline
metrics. Chapter IV will provide quantitative statistics to compare the civil engineer results
with the baseline metrics. Lastly, Chapter V will provide evidence supporting whether or
not SUAS can meet Civil Engineer requirements through the measures of time and quality.
This thesis acknowledges that, as weather limitations are relaxed, mission capabilities
degrade. However, the intent of the study is not to develop an all-weather SUAS; instead,
the objective is to demonstrate that SUAS may be employed to modernize CE airfield
damage assessment requirements.
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II. Literature Review

The current state of airfield damage assessment is a time-consuming and
manpower-intensive mission that requires many parts and pieces to operate in unison to
ensure the highest quality and actionable information is collected in a timely manner. In
the literature review that follows, the current state-of-the-art for United States Air Force
airfield damage assessment and Minimum Operating Strip (MOS) plotting will be
presented to serve as a baseline for the alternative methods that follow.
Succeeding sections examine three technology-based alternatives: 1) in-situ
wireless sensors, 2) Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS), and 3) Unmanned Ground
Vehicles (UGV) that serve as the catalysts for modernizing how airfield damage
assessment is accomplished. Harnessing technologies such as these promises a reduced
labor burden for installations and reduces the hazard exposure of base recovery personnel.
Beyond the baseline comparison, novel capabilities can be enabled by introducing these
technologies. Lastly, by delivering on-scene images to the Emergency Operations Center
(EOC), the higher quality damage repair estimates may be realized. This may be achieved
through reductions in miscommunication of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and damage, as
well as significantly reduced error via a greater number of personnel reviewing the postattack images.
Traditional airfield damage assessment methodology
For this initial section, the current practice for airfield damage assessment will be
detailed through the following six categories: 1) why damage assessment is important, 2)
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airfield damage assessment and MOS plotting team composition, 3) damage assessment
methodology, 4) MOS characteristics, 5) MOS dimensions, and 6) damage plotting and
candidate MOS selection.
Why damage assessment?
In the post-attack condition, damage assessment is one of the earliest base recovery
functions to be performed. Error! Reference source not found. depicts the installation
recovery sequence following an attack. Personnel occupying observation posts and flight
line cameras begin reporting the presence of infrastructure damage, fires, and UXO
sightings to the EOC and/or the Damage Control Center (DCC). Reporting procedures are
specific by local guidance as provided in local Installation Emergency Management Plan
(IEMP) 10-2 (Air Force Civil Engineer Center, 2015a). Appendix B. Airfield Damage
Reconnaissance Organization Concept depicts the Airfield Damage Reconnaissance
(ADR) organization concept that is being employed in current practice.

Figure 2. Installation Recovery Sequence
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The sooner that damage and UXOs are identified, the sooner installation recovery
operations may begin. The weapons system platform for many installations is their
airfield(s); without the ability to launch or recover aerial assets, many installations’
missions – such as strategic airlift, aerial combat, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) – become impossible. Therefore, a rapid, highly detailed, and
accurate depiction of the existing infrastructure damage as well as explosive hazards must
be identified to start recovery activities necessary to restore a base to its operational
mission.
Team composition.
Once the installation commander(s) have ordered the release of recovery personnel
following an attack, installation Civil Engineer Squadrons (CES) deploy their Damage
Assessment Response Teams (DART) as well as Airfield Damage Assessment Teams
(ADAT). Depending on manning levels, ADATs typically consist of four – but no less
than three – members: one engineering technician (commonly referred to as an “EA”), one
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technician, and two augmentees. Appendix C.
Emergency Operations Center Team Organization depicts the current standard for airfield
damage assessment team organization within the EOC.

The EA catalogues airfield

damage, such as craters, spall fields, and other surface/subsurface damage. The EOD Tech
identifies UXOs and other kinetic hazards; and the augmentees serve as vehicle and radio
operators, as well as additional observers, to assist with recording damage and identifying
UXO/kinetic threats. Appendix D. Types of Pavement Damage and Appendix E. UXO
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Classifications provide information concerning the specific types of pavement damage and
UXO classifications, respectively.
Separate from the DART and ADAT teams, the MOS selection team is located in
the EOC, where damage information and recovery planning is centralized. At a minimum,
the MOS selection team is comprised of two personnel, one of which should be an EA,
who is responsible for plotting damage and UXO data, whereas the second team member
may be from any civil engineer functional area who serves as a radio operator and data
recorder.
For installations of sufficient size, the EOCs will be stood up and operated
independently, thus providing multiple MOS selection teams who work towards producing
three candidate MOS locations (each). In situations in which there are multiple runways,
as well as a large number of UXOs and craters, the MOS plotting team may require
augmentation to ensure that data fidelity is maintained and the plotter does not become
overwhelmed. In some locations, staging multiple EAs in addition to multiple radio
operators in the EOC is a standard practice.
Damage assessment methodology.
The number of ADATs dispatched to survey an airfield depends on the size of the
installation; however, there are typically three to four ADATs that survey damage. Airfield
damage assessment is conducted in two phases: 1) initial reconnaissance and 2) detailed
damage assessment. Phase I provides a gross assessment from prepositioned locations
around the airfield. These locations can either be manned observation points, previously
installed camera systems, or other approaches that provide a quick assessment. This
information is reported to the EOC (or DCC) such that Phase II assessments may begin.
12

When the MOS selection team positioned within the EOC has analyzed the Phase I data,
they assume positive control over the ADATs and direct them through Phase II.
In Phase II, the ADATs conduct a detailed assessment of areas specified by the
EOC, such that the MOS may be generated with accuracy and precision. The teams
navigate coordinated routes through areas where damages are the least severe such that
ADATs “avoid areas which are too heavily damaged to warrant consideration in MOS
selection” (Air Force Civil Engineer Center, 2015a). These routes utilize a grid-reference
system (in conjunction with visual reference markers (such as runway distance markers,
the centerline, runway edge lighting, taxiway markers, etc.) to survey the 1) runways, 2)
taxiways, and 3) major aircraft parking aprons and staging areas (Air Force Civil Engineer
Center, 2015a).
MOS characteristics.
The overarching objective in MOS candidate determination is to plot all reported
damages and UXO locations on runway surfaces to determine a MOS that will minimize
the repair time required. This is driven by the lengthy process of crater repair and the desire
to – initially – repair no more damage than is necessary (Air Force Civil Engineer Center,
2015a).

This is achieved by integrating aircraft and operational requirements with the

areas containing the least amount of damage, FOD, or UXOs.
An essential aspect of MOS selection is the capability to launch and recover
aircraft; as such, it is essential that a MOS be considered such that adjoining taxiways allow
for aircraft to transition to and from the airfield from staging and maintenance areas (Air
Force Civil Engineer Center, 2015a). This is referred to as the Launch or Recovery (LOR)
status. LOR status indicates the airfield’s ability to generate sorties, independent of other
13

variables (such as mission time, aircraft attrition, and origin of the aircraft).

LOR

capabilities are shown in Error! Reference source not found..

Table 1. MOS Launch or Recovery Capability
Two Access One Access
Taxi
Taxiways
Taxiway
Backtrack
> 1,000 Ft.

X
X
X
X
X

Taxi
Arresting Air Traffic
Backtrack
System
Control
> 2,000 Ft. Engagement Eqpmt Not
w/Each
Functional
Aircraft
X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

Relative
LOR
Capability

100%
34%
25%
60%
50%
40%
27%
19%

“The Relative LOR Capability of a MOS represents the total number of launches
and recoveries the surface can handle per unit time compared to the number that could be
handled by the same, undamaged airfield” (Air Force Civil Engineer Center, 2015a). A
100% Relative LOR status indicates that the MOS and its access points do not restrict
aircraft launch and recovery operations, whereas a 50% LOR status represents a 50%
reduction in sortie generation and recovery capability. As a minimum, at least two access
routes are desired, preferably one at each end of the MOS. Appendix F. MOS Selection
Checklist, Desirable- & Undesirable Considerations describes a standard MOS selection
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checklist. In addition, eight desirable and six undesirable MOS selection considerations
have also been provided.
MOS dimensions.
The Installation Control Center (ICC) provides MOS dimensions to the MOS
plotting team based upon the known requirements of aircraft to be recovered and/or
launched and mission objectives, aircraft performance and payload, weather, and
environmental conditions. The MOS plotter then constructs a physical template of the
MOS dimensions in the scale of the airfield map. This enables the plotter to rapidly identify
candidate MOSs by superimposing the MOS template on the airfield damage plot (Air
Force Civil Engineer Center, 2015a).
Damage plotting and candidate MOS selection.
MOS selection confirms “the amount of munitions that need to be neutralized and
the amount of damage that will need to be repaired” (Duncan, 2007) to reestablish flying
operations. As such, the three candidate MOSs “must satisfy mission requirements for
sustained operation and must be suitable for the type of aircraft specified by the ICC” (Air
Force Civil Engineer Center, 2015a). MOS selection is completed through the following
four phases: 1) alert status preparation, 2) plotting and candidate MOS generation, 3)
evaluation of candidate MOSs (includes identification of access routes), and 4) briefing the
MOS candidates to the ICC commander for final approval (Air Force Civil Engineer
Center, 2015a; Duncan, 2007).
Upon completion, three [candidate] MOSs are recommended to the ICC
commander, of which the best of the three is typically chosen. It is a good idea to
have a couple of alternate MOS possibilities available in case previously unknown
15

operational requirements surface which impact the suitability of the originally
recommended MOS. At bases where there are two (or more) runways/primary
takeoff and landing surfaces, MOS selection should consider both surfaces. (Air
Force Civil Engineer Center, 2015a)
Variations of performing pavement damage assessment
In the previous subsections, the current state of Air Force airfield damage
assessment has been summarized. The AFPAM 10-219, Volume 4 captures the operating
procedures for United States Air Force Civil Engineers, which closely mirrors that of allied
European nations where United Sates Air Forces and assets are present, such as the Royal
Air Forces of the United Kingdom, the Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica), and the
German Air Force (Luftwaffe). In the sections that follow, alternative methods for
conducting airfield damage assessment will be discussed. While they are not a primary
focus of this research, wireless remote sensors will be mentioned with respect to their
recent contribution to reducing the manpower and resources requirements through
remotely monitoring infrastructure conditions. The majority of the remaining research will
focus on examining image-based infrastructure condition assessment through the use of
small unmanned aircraft systems and unmanned ground vehicles.
Remote sensors.
Over the course of the past decade, greater attention has been placed on harnessing
sensing technologies for monitoring infrastructure and structural systems health. For
example, “…wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are increasingly utilized as alternatives to
traditional structural engineering monitoring systems” (Alavi, Hasni, Lajnef, Chatti, &
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Faridazar, 2015). Through the use of gene expression programming (GEP), probabilistic
neural network (PNN), and three-dimensional finite element (FE) analysis, Alavi et al.
(2016) have been able to demonstrate that sensors imbedded in pavements are “efficiently
capable of detecting different damage states in spite of high-level [electric disturbance]
contamination…[by identifying and] interpreting cumulative time distributions at
preselected discrete strain levels… [thereby facilitating the identification of] crack
propagation as well as possibly localizing the damage and quantifying its severity” (Alavi
et al., 2015).
This breakthrough is not without its limitations, however; “…a major concern for
the application of wireless sensors is related to the difficulties of powering them” (Alavi et
al., 2015). Their methodology requires a substantial quantity of sensors to be imbedded in
throughout paved assets. As such, the requirement to power and maintain each individual
sensor through traditional means (i.e., the power distribution grid) would become a utility
infrastructure project of its own. However, to address this issue, the authors demonstrated
that energy may be harvested from the mechanical loading experienced by the pavement
surface using piezoelectric transducers, thereby enabling the sensors to be self-powered
(Alavi et al., 2015).
The mechanical signal that the piezoelectric transducers detect serve more than a
singular purpose; the traffic loading can be used both for feeding the self-powered sensors
as well as facilitating damage diagnosis (Alavi et al., 2016, 2015). Despite this advantage,
a major area of concern entails “managing the huge amount of data generated by the dense
array of sensors… [data processing is] challenging and costly” (Alavi et al., 2016, 2015).
Conversely, due to noise and distortion in wireless, as well as wired, transmitted
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information, the potential for loss of sensed information further increases the complexity
of remote infrastructure damage assessment and condition monitoring (Alavi et al., 2015).
In addition, for situations in which USAF assets operate out of pre-existing pavements,
such as the occupied Iraqi airfields during Operation Inherent Resolve (2014), civil
engineers would not have access to this infrastructure or data to inform their repair
requirements.
Similarly, the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) investigated the use of
insitu-sensors for airfield damage assessment during the infancy of their Rapid Airfield
Damage Assessment System (RADAS) project. In 2013, AFCEC consulted the Stratech
Group’s iFerret™ tower system and Super Bullseye II™ damage and object scoring
software. This pair performed change detection and analysis to indicate the presence of
damage of foreign objects (Stratech Group, 2013). This approach allows for occupied
airfields to be retrofitted and allow for automated damage detection. However, due to
infrastructure requirements and operational considerations, this approach has been
discontinued.
Unmanned aerial vehicles.
This category consists of both large unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the
Northrop-Grumman surveillance drone, RQ-4 “Global Hawk,” as well as Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (SUAS), and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and vendor builds using
customer specifications. Similar to remote sensors, UAVs have been shown to be a viable
solution to meeting infrastructure assessment requirements.

As a proof of concept,

numerous research teams have developed physical models and computer based algorithms
for the assessment of pavements, as well as structural infrastructure via photographic
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imagery obtained using UAVs (Ellenberg, Kontsos, Moon, & Bartoli, 2011; Eschmann,
Kuo, Kuo, & Boller, 2013; Grandsaert, 2015; Henrickson, Rogers, Lu, & Valasek, 2016;
Na & Baek, 2016; Sankarasrinivasan, Balasubramanian, Karthik, Chandrasekar, & Gupta,
2015; Shepherd & Storm, 2017c, 2017a, 2017b; Siebert & Teizer, 2014; S. Zhang, Bogus,
& Lippitt, 2015; S. Zhang, Lippitt, Bogus, & Neville, 2016).
In 2015, an unmanned, fixed-wing aircraft system was able to capture road
pavement imagery suitable for semi-automated Pavement Condition Index (PCI)
processing. Despite incompleteness in his algorithm, Grandsaert’s (2015) research was
able to demonstrate that using SUAS to collect infrastructure data is a viable alternative to
current Air Force Civil Engineer pavement evaluation methods. In similar studies, the
degradation of natural infrastructure, such as soil erosion (Casella et al., 2016; Colomina
& Molina, 2014; D’Oleire-Oltmanns, Marzolff, Peter, & Ries, 2012; Lindner, Schraml,
Mansberger, & Hübl, 2016; Sinclair Community College, 2017), deforestation and natural
resource management (Getzin, Nuske, & Wiegand, 2014; Getzin, Wiegand, & Schöning,
2012; Johnson, Smith, & Wescott, 2015; Messinger, Asner, & Silman, 2016; Sinclair
Community College, 2017; C. Zhang & Kovacs, 2012), and natural disaster reconnaissance
(Hu, Wu, & Tan, 2012; Iqbal et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2014; Yuan, Zhang, & Liu, 2015) have
been demonstrated through the application of SUAS and computer algorithms. In addition,
some State agencies – such as the Ohio Indiana Unmanned Aerial Systems Center – have
also invested in drone technologies for precision agriculture, infrastructure assessments,
and construction surveys, as well as search and rescue operations (Gallagher, 2017).
The United States Department of Defense has also been developing SUAS for
military uses. Some of the earliest drones were collapsible systems that could be carried
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in a backpack, such as the AeroVironment RQ-11 “Raven,” which was developed and
fielded by the United States Army in 1999 (AeroVironment, 2018). In the mid-2000s,
AFCEC began work on an aerial reconnaissance version of the RADAS project. This
platform was designed to rapidly survey damaged airfields (within 90 minutes), thereby
replacing the four-person teams required to manually conduct damage assessments.
However, under the current approach, AFCEC has acknowledged that their proposed
employment of SUAS usage does not conserve time and consistently requires additional
time to survey, process data, and identify objects of interest (Filler & Diltz, 2016). The
objective of the research was to provide the United States Air Force manpower, time, and
resource savings, as well as improve object detection and quantification (Earth Imaging
Journal, 2015; Echerri, 2015; Idaho National Laboratory, 2009).
Early prototypes of the RADAS incorporated catapult launched, hand launched,
and rolling takeoff fixed-wing air vehicles. These SUAS were outfitted with video
cameras, high-resolution cameras, Sonar, LIDAR, and Infrared sensors, as well as flood
lights to enable night time operations. Over the course of the RADAS project’s evolution,
the fixed-wing approach was abandoned in favor of a multi-rotor.

In current use,

AFCEC’s approach includes a fleet of octo-rotors, each equipped with a cooled, midwave infrared sensor. One of the biggest hurdles is leveraging the data such that desired
outcomes may be achieved. A data analysis algorithm has long been in the works; in
current practice, data must be analyzed manually (Filler & Diltz, 2016).
Due to the scope of the RADAS project, AFCEC asked the Air Force Institute of
Technology (AFIT) to investigate alternatives as well as develop their own prototype.
Beginning in the winter of 2017, seven graduate students began rapid prototyping of a
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system that could survey an airfield, identify pavement damage as well as explosive
hazards, and produce a minimum operating strip solution in under 90 minutes. Initial
designs resembled that of the approach fielded by Shephard and Storm (2017), who utilized
the Altavian F7200 “Nova”, fixed-wing air vehicle (Error! Reference source not found.),
the “Fusion” MP22 modular sensor package, and “Flare” mobile ground control station to
conduct a series of infrastructure assessments. Shephard and Storm’s research team
surveyed two airfields and one highway overpass. Combining the individual flight times
and processing time, the research team generated reports for a 290-acre airfield in 120
minutes and a 30-acre airfield in 15.5 minutes (Shepherd & Storm, 2017a, 2017b) using
the Pix4D™ software. In addition, using the Altavian R8700 “Galaxy” octo-rotor (Error!
Reference source not found.) to survey a seven-acre highway overpass and generate a
report in 82.5 minutes (Shepherd & Storm, 2017c). Ultimately, the AFIT research team
decided upon an approach similar to the RADAS current concept; however, they also
incorporated elements from previous iterations. Their air vehicles and methodology are
described in Chapter III and Appendix I. Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Components

Figure 3. Altavian F7200 Nova (www.altavian.com)
21

Figure 4. Altavian R8700 Galazy (www.altavian.com)

Unmanned ground vehicles.
Akin to unmanned aircraft systems, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are purely
that, a vehicle operated on the ground without a human operator onboard. This category
applies to both programmed robots as well as those controlled remotely via a ground
station.

Aside from their current military employment for munitions and explosive

ordnance disposal, Carroll, Mikell, and Denewiler (2004) have demonstrated that UGVs
may be used for force protection via perimeter monitoring and surveillance, as well as for
providing security for exterior environments (materiel storage yards, arsenals, petroleum
storage areas, airfields, rail yards, port facilities, etc.). Ultimately, the employment of
UGVs enables the military, law enforcement, and other organizations requiring depot
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security to reduce their manpower requirements, as well as provide security with the
reduced threat to human life.
Similarly, Meeks (2016) demonstrated that UGVs may provide manpower savings
in terms of time and human resources when used for storm sewer pipe condition
assessment. Figure 5 depicts three representative images of Meeks’ (2016) crack detection.
Her research drew upon the work of Grandsaert’s (2015) algorithm, through varied
threshold intensity shifts, to identify storm sewer pipe cracking and distresses. Her
research demonstrated that it is possible to complete infrastructure inspections using
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) UGVs and that the “photographic imagery collected was
of sufficient quality and quantity such that [pipe cracking] could be detected” (Meeks,
2016).
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Figure 5. Crack detection on three representative images (Meeks, 2016)

Despite Meeks’ (2016) work focusing on photographic imagery collected from a
ground vehicle, her thesis contributes to constructing the foundation for this thesis. Akin
to Grandsaert (2015), her research as well as this research employ drone technologies for
the assessment and management of Department of Defense infrastructure and assets with
the additional benefit of reduced manpower demands and improved security of civil
engineer personnel.
While not autonomous or remotely piloted, for the previous two decades, the Ohio
Department of Transportation (ODOT) has been fielding technologies to assist with their
biennial paved infrastructure survey. As of March 2017, ODOT has added four pavement
inspection vehicles to their inventory. One of the vehicles collects a series of still images
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from forward, left, right, and rear facing high resolution cameras. Images are collected at
a rate of 200 images per mile (per camera), or one image every 26.4 feet. These images
are tied to Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) coordinates and are supplemented with an
inertial measurement unit (IMU) which fills in gaps where satellite connection is
unavailable (i.e., tunnels or dense city sections). This data is compiled and published in
Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) format, which is a geographic
information systems (GIS) compatible software.
In addition to the high-resolution camera approach, two light-duty vehicles have
been equipped with a 90-degree, sweeping spot laser. This sensor utilizes a technology
similar to a miniature Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) device to obtain
measurements of the pavement surface and is accurate to within 0.25 millimeters or less
(Schleppi, 2018). Finally, within the previous three years, ODOT has commissioned a
heavy-duty cargo van equipped with a higher-powered version of the light-duty vehicle’s
sweeping spot laser system. These latter three vehicles measure the surface profile of
28,000 to 30,000 of the state’s 48,371 lane miles (Federal Highway Administration, 2000)
of paved infrastructure per cycle. Compared to the high-resolution photo-van and other
detection mediums, the data collected with this technology is substantial. For every
assessment, 30 terabytes of storage space is required to house the profile data. In addition,
ODOT has built a dedicated high-performance computer to handle processing profile data.
Lastly, to process this data, ODOT’s computer harnesses a 32-core processor and requires
3-to-6 days to compile the data. While a supercomputer may not be available at all USAF
installations, it would make quick work of processing an airfield survey. For example,
Edwards Air Force Base’s primary runway is among the largest in the USAF inventory and
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consists of 9.8 miles of pavement. This amounts to 0.0203% of the State of Ohio’s paved
infrastructure. Thus, for the ODOT equipment to profile the Edwards AFB runway, it
would require less than two minutes to process the data. Unfortunately, the presence of
damage, UXOs, and bomblet fields exclude this approach as the vehicle would not be able
to profile across upheaval, craters, or cross over explosive hazards.

Table 2. Airfield Assessment Alternative Cost/Benefit Summary

Conventional Airfield Damage Assessment
Wireless Sensor Arrray
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Unmanned Ground Vehicles
Manned Ground Vehicles (ODOT)

Pro
Human presence
Reduces manpower requirements, ensures CE personnel safety, instantaneous
Reduces manpower requirements, ensures CE personnel safety, Geolocation accuracy
Reduces manpower requirements, ensures CE personnel safety, Geolocation accuracy
Reduces manpower requirements, highly precise data

Conventional Airfield Damage Assessment
Wireless Sensor Arrray
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Unmanned Ground Vehicles
Manned Ground Vehicles (ODOT)

Con
Time consuming, hazardous to ADATs, potentially inaccurate
Susceptible to distortion, transmission medium vulnerable to damage, expensive to install
Susceptible to climetological conditions, data transfer may degrade data quality
Requires numerous passes to survey runway, incompatible with craters and explosives
Incompatible with craters and explosives, Sophisticated data processing requirements

Manpower requirements
In terms of identifying alternative methods for airfield pavement evaluation, this
literature review would not be complete without considering the manpower ramifications
of each proposed system. Serving as a baseline with which to measure efficiencies, the
first method to be assessed is the current state of Air Force airfield damage assessment.
USAF status quo.
Following an attack, the EOC (or DCC) will need to have been activated. The
average installation requires that the following civil engineer specialties are represented:
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one EOC Manager (Civil Engineer Officer or Civilian Equivalent), one Fire Emergency
Services representative or civilian equivalent, one Engineering Technician or civilian
equivalent, and one radio/phone operator (any civil engineer). At a minimum, the EOC
requires four CE personnel (refer to Figure 12 in Appendix C. Emergency Operations
Center Team Organization). For installations requiring that the alternate EOC be activated
simultaneously, this number increases to eight. In addition to the EOC, the Civil Engineer
Squadron’s (or Group) Unit Control Center (UCC) will also be activated. The CE UCC is
the main hub for dispatching ADAT and DART teams, as well as mobilizing installation
recovery assets and resources. At a minimum, the CE UCC requires the following
personnel: one UCC Manager (Civil Engineer officer or civilian equivalent), one
Operations Engineer or civilian equivalent, and one to two radio/phone operators (any civil
engineer). Thus, the CE UCC manpower staffing requires – at minimum – four personnel.
Irrespective of the alternative approaches described in subsequent sections, these
manpower requirements remain fixed; eight personnel will always be required as a
collective summation of the EOC and CE UCC manning requirements. As such, in the
alternative approaches that follow, only the ADAT manpower requirements will be
described.
For the majority of installations, personnel assigned to ADAT and DART teams
fulfill both roles. This arrangement is driven largely by manpower, equipment, and asset
availability.

In general, three to four, four-member teams are standing by for the

Installation Commander’s order to begin recovery actions. Thus, the combined manpower
requirements from the Civil Engineer Squadron (or Group) ranges between 17 and 28
personnel. Of note, this only accounts for one shift of civil engineers manning either the
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EOC, UCC, or ADAT/DART duties. Therefore, in order to support 24-hour operations,
these numbers will need to be doubled (at least). However, as it pertains to conducting the
damage assessments following an attack, only one shift of engineers should be required if
the 4-hour recovery of airfield damage standard is to be upheld (Air Force Civil Engineer
Center, 2015a).
Wireless sensor array.
For the scenario in which the airfield has been constructed with Alavi et al.’s (2015)
piezoelectric transducer powered in-situ sensors, the manpower requirements change
significantly. The manpower demands of the EOC and UCC remain unchanged; either
four personnel each or two EOCs, thus requiring 12 personnel. The difference lies within
the airfield assessment; due to the sensors performing the job of the ADATs, the
aforementioned three to four teams of three to four personnel will not be required to leave
the CE compound. Instead, damage location and information will be wirelessly transmitted
to either the EOC or UCC (or both) throughout the bombardment. Therefore, the damage
information is available immediately; other units will not be required to call in phase one
airfield damage, thus enabling them to direct their efforts to other endeavors.
A few significant roadblocks emerge from this approach: UXOs, sensor system
status, and unintelligible data (electronic disturbance). The one factor that this approach
does not consider is the identification or classification of UXOs. Therefore, to enable CE
repair crews to mobilize, a visual inspection will still be required such that UXOs may be
identified and cleared. Finally, this approach relies on the sensor array to be operational
following the attack and that the data transmitted is clear enough such that candidate MOSs
may be identified. Of note, Alavi et al.’s (2016) research focused on sensors that were
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positioned within asphalt pavements that were self-powered by the mechanical loading of
vehicle traffic. Within the context of airfield pavements, mechanical loading may occur
too infrequently to be feasible for airfield pavement health monitoring. Due to these
shortcomings, it may be said that the wireless sensor array does not save manpower
demands. However, it may serve as a means to expedite the candidate MOS selection
process via the instant data feedback immediately following an attack.
Unmanned aircraft systems and ground vehicles.
Similar to the manpower composition using the wireless sensor array, the
employment of unmanned air and ground vehicles require the same EOC and UCC staffing.
In addition, an SUAS approach to airfield damage assessment would require significantly
less manpower to accomplish versus the traditional ADAT method. In the methodology
that follows, the method described herein requires only four personnel to operate the fixedwing SUAS: one Ground Control Station (GCS) operator, one Safety Pilot (SP), and two
technicians, whereas the hex-rotor requires three personnel (one GCS Operator, one SP,
and one tech) (refer to Table 27. AFIT SUAS 217m Airfield Assessment Times & 3000m
in Appendix K. Baseline Metrics and Civil Engineer Officer Statistics). This effectively
cuts ADAT team requirements by 67-75%. Furthermore, by only requiring a GCS operator
and an SP, the employment of UGVs further reduces the boots-on-the-ground presence by
83-88%. Comparatively, the Sinclair research team only required three personnel to
operate their SUAS: one GCS operator, one safety pilot, and one observer/technician. This
approach reduces ADAT requirements by 75-81.3%.
Conversely, the current concept of the RADAS project may increase ADAT
presence by 200-400%. This is driven by the quantity of air vehicles being fielded
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simultaneously (16 octo-rotors). To effectively pilot an SUAS, it is highly recommended
that a dedicated ground control station, operator, and safety pilot must monitor each air
vehicle individually. However, given adequate ground control station configuration and
team coordination, a dual ground control station, with dedicated operators, may control all
16 of the octo-rotors simultaneously. This provides similar manpower savings of 67-75%
compared to this thesis.
Lastly, with respect to the manned ground vehicles fielded by ODOT, at least two
operators are required per vehicle. In addition, at least one dedicated technician will be
required for data processing and support functions. Thus, if only one vehicle is fielded, a
total of four personnel will be required. However, if the ODOT method is to be applied
with traditional airfield damage assessment methods, two vehicles will be required, thereby
requiring an additional vehicle operation pair and data analyst, which amounts to seven
personnel. Strictly comparing the number of personnel in the field, this method saves 4256% of manpower requirements.

Table 3. Airfield Assessment Alternatives Summary

Conventional Airfield Damage Assessment
Wireless Sensor Arrray
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Unmanned Ground Vehicles
Manned Ground Vehicles (ODOT)

Manpower* Time Requirement (3km Rwy**) Data Processing (3km Rwy**) Data Analysis (3km Rwy**)
12-16
20-30 min
N/A
5-10 minutes
0
Instantaneous
Instantaneous
45-minutes**
3
90-105 min
3.2-hours
45-minutes**
3
No Data
No Data
No Data
2
20-30 min
15-seconds
45-minutes**

*Excludes EOC amd UCC personnel
**Baseline and experimental data in this thesis (see Chapter IV)
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Market analysis
A market analysis was performed on the commercial SUAS market to identify
potential candidates to meet Air Force airfield damage assessment requirements. For a
complete breakdown of unit costs (including subsystem components, software, and labor
fees), refer to Table 16 (Appendix I).
Fixed-wing air vehicles.
The complete system used in this thesis required a fixed-wing air vehicle
(Skywalker X8), a catapult launcher, a Sony HD Block Camera, communications
equipment, and a ground station. Excluding assembly, tuning, and configuration labor
costs, this thesis’s fixed-wing air vehicle amounted to $7,034.10. Excluding batteries, an
imaging device, and shipping and handling fees, a ready-made Skywalker X8 costs
$7,455.97 (“UAV Systems International: Skywalker Ready-to-fly Drone,” 2018). The
Altavian air vehicle used by Shepherd and Storm (2017) (the F7200 “Nova”) ranged from
$15,180 to $19,260 (price includes Altavian’s ground station, software, and sensor
package) (Altavian, 2018).
Vertical Takeoff and Landing air vehicles.
The Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) air vehicle used in this thesis (Tarot
hex-rotor) cost $6,105.86. A comparable, ready-to-fly muli-rotor using either a DJI S800,
S900, S1000 or the CineStar 8 frame (including the same ground station, software, gimbal,
and imaging device used in this thesis) ranges between $6,965.21 and $7,975.21
(www.RC-Drones.com, 2018). The Altavian multi-rotor (the R8700 “Galaxy”) used by
Shepherd & Storm (2017) cost $15,100 (price excludes assembly, tuning, and shipping
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fees) (Altavian, 2018).
Summary
This literature review has identified a few useful themes with respect to measuring
the efficacy of employing remote sensing technologies for airfield damage assessment.
Included in the body of knowledge was evidence supporting infrastructure condition
monitoring through self-powered sensor arrays. In addition, numerous research teams
demonstrated the ability of aerial as well as ground-based unmanned vehicles with respect
to condition assessment and data collection. Moreover, each of the aforementioned
mediums examined in this review provide solutions for organizations to conserve their
manpower while remaining true to their mission requirements and directives.
Unfortunately, based upon the body of knowledge, the area that requires additional
investigation is remote airfield damage assessment in the post-attack environment.
Numerous studies surveyed the aftermath of natural disasters, identified the presence of
deforestation and landmass topography changes due to erosion, and detected the presence
of cracking and distresses in infrastructure. However, the area that requires further
examination is the ability of remote sensing technologies to provide actionable information
pertaining to the location, quantity, and scope of recent airfield damage, as well as the
presence of explosive hazards for the generation of a minimum airfield operating surface.
Furthermore, while these technologies have proven successful in identifying objects of
interest, they have not been used to survey a large area and identify UXO and other kinetic
threats under considerable time constraints.
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Moreover, each of these technologies

presented were tested irrespective of the time required to unpack, assemble, launch,
conduct the mission, recover, and process their data.
In the methodology that follows, this thesis will establish the baseline performance
level of conventional airfield assessment methods and survey a runway using SUAS to
identify and geo-locate the presence of UXOs. Table 4 summarizes conventional airfield
assessment measures identified in AFPAM 10-219, Volume 4. In addition, the measures
this thesis will investigate are provided.

Table 4. Airfield Assessment Criteria Summary
Conventional Airfield Damage Assessment Measures
Airfield Assessment Time
MOS Plotting Time
Quantity Craters
Quantity Spall Fields
Quantity UXOs
Quantity Bomblet Fields
Crater, Spall Field, & Bomblet Field Sizing
Crater, Spall Field, UXO, & Bomblet Field Locating
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Baseline & SUAS Airfield Damage Assessment Measures
Equipment Assembly & Airfield Assessment Time
Data Processing & Analysis Time
Crater, Spall Field, UXO, & Bomblet Field False Positives
Crater, Spall Field, UXO, & Bomblet Field False Negatives
Crater, Spall Field, UXO, & Bomblet Field Mis-Identification
Crater, Spall Field, UXO, & Bomblet Field Sizing
Crater, Spall Field, UXO, & Bomblet Field Locating
Manpower Requirements

III. Methodology

This chapter discusses the four aspects of the research method.

First, the

establishment of baseline metrics for conventional airfield damage assessment – including
the sizing and locating of craters, spall fields, and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) – is
discussed. This section includes a description of the test subjects who were evaluated to
produce the baseline metrics, an overview of what the subjects were evaluated on as well
as how they were evaluated, and establishes the status quo. Second, Civil Engineer damage
assessment performance is measured using a pre-existing set of aerial imagery and two
distinct analysis platforms.

This section includes a description of what levels of

performance are measured, a description of how they are evaluated, presents summary
statistics for each of the separate damage assessment methods, and single-tail hypothesis
testing to compare their performance against the baseline metrics. Third, evaluation
methods for using SUAS imagery will describe object identification accuracy – for false
positives as well as false negatives – and define time requirements to complete a damage
assessment. Finally, assessment of manpower requirements, costs, and savings related to
SUAS use will be described. In addition, a cost breakout of required equipment and
consumables, as well as comparable COTS systems, will be provided.
Acquiring baseline airfield damage assessment metrics
To produce a relevant model for implementing positive change in the current
airfield damage assessment techniques, an understanding of the status quo is required. To
achieve this, anonymous test subjects from the enlisted Engineering and Explosive
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Ordnance Disposal career fields were sampled at the Silver Flag Contingency Training site,
located at Tyndall Air Force Base, Panama City, Florida. The EOD technicians and
Engineers – alternatively referred to as “engineering assistants” or “EAs”– were evaluated
while participating in a field exercise during their triennial Silver Flag encampment. Every
three years, all enlisted and commissioned Civil Engineer specialties travel to a Silver Flag
training site to sharpen their contingency skills and rehearse base recovery procedures in
the post-attack condition. For this study, three encampments – composing nine, fourperson teams – were observed on 10 August 2017, 28 September 2017, and 12 December
2017. Teams were evaluated by subject matter experts (SMEs) from their respective
specialty, monitored for proficiency, and instructed in the pursuit of further contingency
response skill development.
Evaluation focus areas.
The EAs were evaluated using three attributes. The first attribute was the time
required to respond, assess, record, plot damage and UXOs on an airfield map, and
determine the optimal MOS solution(s). An assumption was made that the EAs had already
received the aircraft operational requirements from the Crisis Action Team (CAT) prior to
mobilization of ADAT assets. The second attribute was the accuracy of identifying craters,
spalls, and UXOs.

This also included the incidence of false positives (i.e., the

misclassification of debris as a UXO or the incorrect sizing of a crater or spall field) and
false negatives (missing airfield damage or explosive hazards). Lastly, the third attribute
described the accuracy with which findings were identified in relation to their position on
the airfield map. Location errors have the potential to produce an incorrect operating
picture of the scale and quantity of damage, debris, and UXOs, as well as their positions
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relative to one another on the airfield. Incorrectly locating objects may render MOS plots,
and eventual recovery procedures as well as material quantities and time estimates,
insufficient or vastly suboptimal. Similarly, the EOD technicians were evaluated on their
ability to 1) identify the presence of explosive hazards, 2) correctly classify the hazard
identified, and 3) accurately identify the location and/or scale/quantity of the hazard
present.
To establish baseline metrics, the study of enlisted civil engineers produced five
quantitative metrics and one qualitative metric. From the first attribute – time – the baseline
metric will be the summation of the average ADAT run and MOS plotting components.
This metric accounts for the range of time required to conduct an airfield damage
assessment using the conventional approach. A limitation of the baseline data set lies
within the omission of exact ADAT airfield assessments. The test administrators annotated
that, on average, ADATs took no less than 20 minutes and no longer than 30 minutes to
complete the 3,000-meter route (Abrego & Moore, 2017). In addition, the time required
to produce a MOS solution was not provided. However, within the context of the
conventional airfield damage assessment methodology, damage and explosive hazards are
communicated to the EOC/UCC during the assessment. Therefore, all identified damage
and objects are known to the MOS plotting team upon completion of the ADAT run. Thus,
identifying candidate MOS solutions adds no more than five minutes to the total time.
The second attribute – identification accuracy – produces three metrics: correct
identification of damage and/or objects and debris, quantity of false positive identifications,
and quantity of false negative identifications.

The correct identification metric is

comprised of each of the nine ADAT exercises’ objects. A binary value was recorded for
36

this measure, either if the team correctly identifies the object in question, it is marked
correct, whereas if they identify the object as anything other than what the Silver Flag test
cards specified, it is marked as an incorrect identification. For the second and third metrics
from the identification accuracy attribute, false positives occur when 1) pavement damage
(i.e., a crater or spall field) is misidentified as an explosive hazard or 2) a UXO is identified
that was not provided by the test administrators’ test cards. Similarly, the false negative
metric describes the ADATs’ failure to identify explosive hazards (UXOs and bomblet
fields). The occurrence of pavement damage false positives – the identification of damage
that does not exist or multiple counting of the same damage feature – is eliminated via the
use of either a single ADAT team or ADAT teams assessing predefined sectors. As such,
this thesis does not acknowledge pavement damage false positives. Similarly, with the
exception of subsurface damage (Figure 6), pavement damage false negatives do not occur.
Data in Chapter IV as well as Appendix G supports this claim. Due to limitations in the
airfield dataset used in this thesis, subsurface damage is not addressed.
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Figure 6. Subsurface Damage

The third attribute – location accuracy – produces two metrics: conformance with
assessment solution and conformance with GPS accuracy. At the test administrator’s
admission, during the first five evaluations, explosive hazard coordinates were not recorded
(Abrego & Moore, 2017). Therefore, for these metrics, damage features and explosive
hazards will be measured separately. In the latter four evaluations, coordinates were
provided for all objects included in the assessment, thus explosive hazard locations may be
measured over 16 of the 36 total explosive hazards.
Finally, position accuracy versus GPS will be measured individually for centerline
positioning of craters and spall fields, centerline positioning of explosive hazards, left-toright (of the runway centerline) positioning of craters and spall fields, and left-to-right
positioning of explosive hazards. Enlisted civil engineers use a combination of the
pavement reference marking system (PRMS) and approximation to derive their
coordinates. In addition to edge markers, typical airfields are paved in 20-foot square
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sections. The pavement seams, therefore, allow for fairly accurate approximation to occur.
By contrast, civilian GPS systems have a horizontal accuracy of 4.0 meters and may be as
precise as 3.0 meters in some locations without the addition of corrective devices
(Department of Defense & NAVSTAR, 2008). Therefore, the occurrence of conventional
damage and explosive hazard positioning will be compared with standard GPS accuracy.
Due to the nature of the MATLAB™ GUI and the 2D ortho-mosaic (to be described
in subsequent sections), all airfield images used in this thesis are timestamped and
positioned within space via the telemetry logs recorded by each air vehicle’s autopilot.
Previous AFIT experimentation has determined that an air vehicle using the Pixhawk
autopilot and GPS unit may be located to within 3.0 meters at any given time. However,
the spatial information of images is subject to instantaneous body angle distortion and time
delays that further decrease the confidence level of the precise location of an object. Thus,
for each pixel represented on screen using the MATLAB™ GUI and the Pix4D™ software,
objects and damage indicated using onscreen commands elicits an xy-positioning accuracy
within 10 meters. However, with the inclusion of surveyed Ground Control Points (GCP),
Pix4D™ is capable of locating features within the degree of accuracy of the GCPs.
Evaluation procedure.
Due to the need to keep airfield damage assessment testing strict, the ADAT runs
are conducted separately from the other civil engineer exercise scenarios. Thus, the EAs
and EOD Techs being evaluated do not experience any interference or distraction from
other activities that may lead to incorrect measurements or reports. Once the ADAT has
been staged – as would occur under real-world conditions – the test administrators call into
the mock EOC to begin the exercise. Once the “All Clear” message has been provided, the
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ADAT(s) disembarks from their staging location in a six-passenger, light-duty pickup to
begin the airfield assessment. Upon arrival, the front passenger manages navigation and
communications for the driver, whereas the rear passengers (one EA and one EOD Tech)
begin identifying objects and damage along the runway. All objects and damage are
annotated in a log book and radioed back to EAs manning the EOC such that MOS plotting
may begin as soon as the ADAT(s) complete their route.
Upon completion of the ADAT run, the EAs inside the EOC begin plotting the
damage on a scaled airfield map, identifying areas in which the EOD Techs need to
neutralize explosive hazards, and determining if an aircraft arresting system may need to
be installed (based upon aircraft operational requirements). In addition, this plot identifies
areas in which the pavement repair team should focus to make the fewest number of repairs
such that the runway can return to operational status in the least amount of time.
Throughout the initial response and mobilization, airfield assessment, and MOS plotting,
the EA and EOD evaluators annotate each team’s strengths and weaknesses. At no time
during the evaluation are teams permitted to ask for additional information regarding the
quantity, scale, or placement of objects and damage along the runway surface.
Evaluation parameters.
During the baseline study, test facilitators placed a total of eight objects on a 3,000foot section of runway. Typical assessment configurations include four damage locations
and four explosive hazards. An example scenario includes two craters, two spall fields,
three UXOs, and one bomblet field. The average time to assess the runway surface ranges
between 20 and 30 minutes. Any surveys shorter than this range tend to elicit high false
negative rates, whereas surveys in excess of the 30-minute mark, while detailed, tend not
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to provide any additional benefit. The relationship between these parameters will be
described in Chapter IV. Each of the nine teams evaluated during the three encampments
were comprised of two EOD Techs and two EAs – each ranging in skill levels three
(novice) through seven (relative expert). The six-baseline metrics will be essential in
evaluating the efficacy of aerial images for airfield damage assessments, which will be
discussed in the following section.
Civil engineer officer testing and evaluation procedures
Using data gathered during the AFIT, Small UAS Test and Evaluation (SENG 651),
summer 2017 capstone experiment (refer to Error! Reference source not found.), civil
engineer officers were evaluated on their ability to identify and locate a series of craters
and UXOs on a digital airfield map using two disparate versions of the same data set.
Compared to the enlisted performance evaluated in the previous section, Civil Engineer
officers are not subject matter experts on airfield damage assessment. Instead, they possess
a generalized knowledge of each specialty within the career field. However, for the two
methods that follow, specialized training on airfield damage assessment is not required;
instead, general knowledge of airfield pavements and explosive ordnance is. In addition,
where the enlisted civil engineers were evaluated for assessment speed and precision, the
officer assessments did not include time constraints. As such, assessment times were
normally distributed.
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The first expression leveraged a series of still images collected by a 1080p Sony
Block Camera mounted to the underside of a Skywalker X8 (Fpvmodel, 2017) SUAS
flying at an altitude of 40 meters. Test subjects reviewed a sequence of images within a
custom MATLAB™ script written by Allen (2017). The Graphical User Interface (GUI)
provided test subjects with the ability to advance through images, identify UXOs, and
create polygons outlining craters and/or spall fields. The net result produced Mission
Planner™ waypoints for a Tarot T960 hex-rotor (Helipal, 2017b) SUAS to fly as well as
produce a MOS superimposed on a satellite image of the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Area B. The MATLAB waypoint file enables the generation of a detailed inspection of
UXOs. One limitation of this approach is the final image resolution viewed by the user.
Through the inclusion of the Epiphan™ Av.io 4K capture card, images were transmitted
from the air vehicle at full resolution. However, due to the size of the ground control
station monitor, images were scaled down from 1080p (1920x1080) by 20% within the
GUI. Resulting image resolution was approximately 864p (1536x864). This allows users
to view images alongside on-screen commands.
The second dataset was built upon the former, based upon the waypoints generated
by the MATLAB™ GUI during the original airfield assessment. Thus, the second data
set’s images were dependent upon the image analysis of the first data set. This approach
leveraged a two-dimensional (2D) ortho-mosaic of the runway constructed through a series
of still images collected using a Sony α6000 camera, which was mounted to the underside
of a Tarot hex-rotor flying at an altitude of 80 meters. Unlike the fixed-wing image
resolution, airfield data was transferred via micro-USB on the ground. This allowed the
24.3-megapixel image resolution to be maintained, resulting in a 21.4-megapixel image
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(37,014 x 5,801) with a horizontal resolution of 96 Dots Per Inch (DPI), and a vertical
resolution of 96 DPI.
Air vehicle configurations for both the Skywalker X8 and the Tarot hex-rotor will
be discussed later in this chapter as well as in Appendix I. Small Unmanned Aerial Systems
Components. Test subjects were provided with the ortho-mosaic (produced using the
Pix4DTM software). Using the output image file, subjects indicated the presence of damage
and UXOs as they appeared.

Due to licensing restrictions, civil engineer officer

evaluations were limited to the 2D ortho-mosaic sans the Pix4D™ software. As such, the
2D map was viewed as an image file and manipulated manually with a pointing device.
When assessed using the Pix4D™ software, objects identified on screen would have the
same level of GPS accuracy as those identified using the MATLAB™ GUI. This is enabled
by the software’s integration of telemetry logs collected during the hex-rotor’s flight and
aerial imaging.
Finally, between both CE officer analysis procedures, test subjects did not perform
practice trials or repeat trials. Prior to evaluation, subjects were provided 5 to 10 minutes
of instruction on how to use each interface as well as provided with the desired outcomes.
For this analysis, the research sought to exclude the effects of learning-curve and assess
the performance of each analysis medium. Moreover, subjects were not placed under any
time constraints; instead, once participants felt satisfied with their analysis of the airfield
imagery, they self-terminated the evaluation. It is the researcher’s opinion that additional
trials would not improve object detection or identification. Furthermore, it is hypothesized
that time constraints would decrease object detection performance. Lastly, the author
hypothesizes that, due to the generalized skillset of civil engineer officers (as well as their
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lack of familiarity with the airfield prior to imaging), their UXO and damage detection
proficiency will be less than the EAs and EOD Technicians.
MATLAB™ GUI analysis procedure.
For the first look at the airfield data, after a 5-minute introduction the interface,
subjects operated two MATLAB scripts, “Main.m” and “analyzeFrames.m” (Appendix L.
MAIN.m MATLAB™ Script and Appendix M. AnalyzeFrames.m MATLAB™ Script,
respectively). The former served as the bedrock for the GUI; it built the register for
onscreen commands and ingested the telemetry and image pairs. The latter script used the
visual display and a mouse click to identify features associated with telemetry information.
In addition, this script reached externally to Google Earth™ to produce an airfield map
with pins and polygons indicating the presence of damage or explosive hazards.
When images and telemetry logs were loaded, subjects advanced through the
dataset using the following onscreen commands: “Previous Frame”, “Next Frame”,
“UXO”, “Crater”, “Generate Waypoints”, and “Locate MOS.” The first two options
advanced or reversed the frame-telemetry log pair. These commands were used at will
until the subject was comfortable with their assessment. The “UXO” button produced a
popup window – mirroring the current image – with a new menu of options: “Delete
Placement”, “Confirm Placement”, and “Go Back.” On this screen, the analyst hovers their
cursor over the object, single-left clicks, and then chooses the class of ordnance from a
dropdown menu. When complete, the subject deletes the placement, confirms placement,
or – should they have selected the UXO button in error – returns to the main GUI. This
process is repeated for each object identified. One of the limitations of the MATLAB GUI
is that the UXO screen can only record one input at a time.
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Similarly, when subjects encountered a damaged section of pavement, they selected
the “Crater” button. This menu operates in much the same fashion as the UXO screen;
however, it has its differences. The menu options now include: “Confirm Placement”,
“Cancel Last P[oin]t”, and “Go Back.” Similar to the UXO screen, subjects hover their
cursor over an aspect of the damage and single-left click to place a pin. However, in the
Crater screen, subjects may continue to add pins until they have created a polygon
surrounding the damage. When subjects are satisfied with their placement, they may click
“Confirm Placement” or – if they have made an error – they may remove a point or return
to the main screen. This process is also repeated for each damage location until the subject
is confident in their airfield assessment.
When subjects have completed their UXO and crater detection and geo-location,
they single-left click the “Generate Way Points” button. This produces a field requesting
an altitude for the hex-rotor to fly. Finally, subjects single-left click the “Locate MOS”
button. The GUI then automatically produces an image of the airfield and overlays the
indicated damage and UXOs and produces a rectangle indicating the placement of a MOS.
This rectangle is based upon MOS dimensions that have been hardcoded into the script and
is optimized via particle swarm optimization. The evaluation is over when the subject has
produced a MOS plot. At this point, the total time to analyze the frames and produce a
MOS is recorded. Additionally, the test proctor annotates correct UXO and crater/spall
field placements, false positives, and false negatives on a test card. For the purpose of this
thesis, the only metrics that were considered were the time to analyze, correct identification
of objects, and number of UXO false negatives. Due to test subject unfamiliarity with
airfield conditions prior to placement of objects, false positive rates would be artificially
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high. In numerous instances, airfield image analysts – both for the MATLAB GUI and the
2D ortho-mosaic – identified rust spots and discolored pavement as damage or FOD. It is
the researcher’s opinion that, under real-world conditions, analysts will be keenly aware of
the state of their runway surfaces prior to attack. As such, the occurrence of false positives
would be significantly lower than identified in this thesis. For further details regarding the
MATLAB GUI procedures, refer to
Appendix H. Civil Engineer Officer Evaluation Protocol.
Ortho-mosaic analysis procedure.
For the second dataset analysis, the approach is far more user friendly than the
MATLAB GUI. Due to licensing limitations, subjects were not provided with a copy of
the Pix4D™ software with which to analyze images and identify objects. Instead, the
images collected from the hex-rotor were stitched together using telemetry logs, point
clouds, and common features to produce a 2D ortho-mosaic in .jpeg format. Compared to
the ODOT data processing system, the computer that produced this image was equipped
with an Intel® i7-6700, 2.60GHz processor, with 32 gigabytes of random access memory,
and an Intel® HD 530 graphics processing unit. This device required 14 minutes to stich
46 images into a 2D ortho-mosaic.
This approach allows virtually any computer to access the file – as opposed to the
MATLAB GUI that requires a license of MATLAB 2016b (in addition to various graphics
and analysis add-ons) – thereby making the 2D ortho-mosaic a more versatile tool. In
analyzing the ortho-mosaic, subjects zoomed in on the image – either using the scroll wheel
on their pointing device or using onscreen commands – to an average zoom level of 250%
and hovered their cursor over objects of interest. The maximum zoom level used was 350%
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magnification; beyond this level of zoom (up to 500%), image resolution did not improve
any further and resulted in users losing their frame of reference within the ortho-mosaic.
In the same fashion that the test administrator annotated progress during the MATLAB
trials, subject object detection was similarly annotated on a test card. The assumption with
this approach is that, had Pix4D™ been used, objects could be pinned the same as the
MATLAB GUI and a Python™ script could be run concurrently such that a similar MOS
plot could be drawn using Google Earth™. However, for this thesis, the only factors
considered were: time to analyze, correct identification of objects, and false negatives. For
the same reason provided in the MATLAB approach, false positives were not analyzed;
despite the higher image resolution provided by the 2D ortho-mosaic, subjects lacked the
familiarity with the runway surface to distinguish damage or UXOs from existing oil and
rust stains or known pavement distresses.
Civil engineer officer hypothesis testing.
Upon completion of CE officer performance measurement using the MATLAB
GUI and the 2D ortho-mosaic, hypothesis testing is conducted to measure relative
performance. The three CE officer metrics are measured against 1) the corresponding
baseline metric and 2) the corresponding metric of the opposing analysis method (i.e.,
MATLAB versus the 2D ortho-mosaic). The first series of hypothesis tests use single-tail
t-tests to compare performance of the experimental approaches to the control (baseline
metrics). The second set of hypothesis tests use single-tail t-tests to compare performance
of the experimental approaches against one another (i.e., MATLAB versus the 2D orthomosaic).
Summary and metrics.
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This comparison sought to identify the ideal amount of processing time and
quantity of images commensurate with a fast, accurate, and reliable airfield damage
assessment and eventual MOS plotting. In addition, the difference between the Sony Block
Camera (MATLAB GUI) and the Sony α6000 (2D ortho-mosaic) indicate whether greater
pixel density and/or camera resolution results in greater object detection.
These tests produce the following three metrics: 1) the average time required to
conduct an airfield assessment, 2) correct identification of damage, explosive hazards, and
debris, and 3) quantity of explosive hazard false negatives. Due to limitations previously
described, civil engineer officer subjects did not have familiarity with the runway surface
at the time the airfield images were collected. As such, false positive detection would be
artificially inflated; therefore, the false positive metric was not observed. In future
examinations, there are two alternatives to allow for the inclusion of this metric: 1) scan
the airfield prior to object placement and allow analysts to review the pavement’s
preexisting conditions, or 2) utilize test subjects familiar with pavement conditions prior to
object placement. In addition, civil engineer officer subjects are limited to the geo-location
accuracy of the airfield images. Therefore, location accuracy metrics were not measured
against their performances.
The first metric evaluates the sum of the average time required to complete the
digital assessment and the SUAS operation component times that were obtained during the
SENG 651 capstone experiment (Appendix K. Baseline Metrics and Civil Engineer Officer
Statistics). The second metric measures accuracy of the civil engineer officers’ findings
(i.e., correct identification of a crater versus a UXO versus FOD). Lastly, the third metric
measures the rate at which false negatives present themselves in relation to the amount of
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time spent analyzing airfield imagery.

Air vehicle configuration
In the section that follows, descriptions, specifications, and the applications for
each of the components of the SUAS used to collect data in support of the thesis have been
provided. The rationale for including each piece of equipment is discussed as well as how
each component contributes to completing the research objective. Refer to Appendix I.
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Components for complete descriptions of the SUAS
components and Table 16. SUAS Equipment Cost Summary for a cost summary sheet.
Air vehicles.
As previously indicated, two distinct SUAS platforms were used: a fixed-wing
airframe and a multi-rotor airframe. The total system, which is referred to as the “Pave
Scout System,” incorporates both air vehicles as well as their respective ground stations.
The fixed-wing air vehicle is a custom Skywalker X-8 build (Fpvmodel, 2017), whereas
the multi-rotor is a custom hexa-copter (six, non-coaxial propellers) built on a Tarot T960
frame (Helipal, 2017b). The Pave Scout mission is broken down into two phases: survey
and inspection. The Skywalker fulfills the survey mission by rapidly flying the length of
the runway(s), relevant taxiway(s), and parking apron(s). Data collected by the Skywalker
is then used to develop a constellation of waypoints for the Tarot hex-rotor to inspect.
Phase two is a detailed assessment of areas identified during the previous phase. The
following are configuration and mission parameters for each of the airframes.
The Skywalker X-8, “Flying Wing” (Figure 7) is a commercial off-the-shelf
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(COTS) ‘delta-wing’ shaped lifting body that is readily available through a multitude of
online vendors. With a wingspan of 2.12 meters, the Skywalker employed in this thesis
has been modified for greater control and in-flight stability. Structural modifications of
note include stiffened wing spars, elevators, and winglets. The propulsion system consists
of a Turnigy G46 brushless, outrigger electronic 670 kV motor and 13x7 foldable, pusher
propeller. The sensor package is a Sony HD Block Camera that has been mounted forward
facing at a 60-degree downward pointing angle (Error! Reference source not found..
The interior has been customized for mounting Lithium-Polymer (Li-Po) batteries,
communications components, and optimizing the air vehicle’s center of gravity. Lastly,
this application of the Skywalker X8 does not call for a landing gear. The research team
determined that, in the post-attack condition, the airfield surface may not be conducive to
rolling takeoffs or landings. Therefore, a catapult assisted takeoff (Figure 9) and “belly
landing” approach was implemented.

Further fixed-wing air vehicle configuration

information can be found in Appendix I.
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Figure 7. Skywalker X-8, "Flying Wing"
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Figure 8. Skywalker X-8 Camera Mount

Figure 9. Skywalker Catapult Launch Apparatus
The objective of the fixed-wing airframe is to rapidly launch a stable platform for
52

aerial imaging. It must be power efficient for sufficient endurance and be durable for
multiple launches and recoveries. In addition, data collected must provide an image
resolution that allows accurate object detection. For this thesis, the minimum image
resolution requirement is 720p (1,280x720).

Lastly, individual component times

(assembly, system checkout, launch, mission, and data collection), should amount to a
cumulative time less than the status quo for an airfield surface of 3,000x50 meters. The
Skywalker X8 fits this description perfectly; it is light, stable in-flight, and enables GCS
operators to gather the preliminary HD video footage necessary to produce the waypoints
required for phase two inspections. This air vehicle is flown at an airspeed of 17 meters
per second and is operated at an altitude of 40 meters above the airfield surface.
If the airframe and catapult launcher are assembled and systems checked
independently – using a crew size of four (one GCS operator, two technicians, and one
safety pilot) – assembly and systems checkout requires 12 minutes to complete (refer to
Appendix N). Launching the vehicle requires a safety pilot (SP) and a GCS operator. From
the time of launch to achieving stable flight at an altitude of 40 meters, this step in the
survey phase takes 30-45 seconds. Once stable flight has been achieved, the SP switches
the air vehicle over to “Auto Mode” and the pre-planned flight pattern will be executed in
accordance with the GCS Operator and Mission Planner’s™ instructions.
As the Skywalker navigates the pattern, the Sony Block Camera transmits a live
preview of the airfield surfaces to the secondary GCS operator using the Connex HD
transmitter and receiver (Amimon Ltd., 2016), as well as to the AV.io 4K video capture
card. As objects appear within the field of view, the secondary GCS operator clicks –
anywhere in the frame – to begin capturing still images of that position and moment in
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time. The Sony camera continues to capture images at a rate of 0.14 seconds/image,
producing an overlap of 40%. This procedure continues throughout the duration of the
flight until all affected areas have been surveyed and/or the Skywalker no longer has
sufficient battery voltage (3.3 volts/cell) and must be recovered. Following recovery, the
secondary GCS operator reviews the still images gathered to identify craters, spall fields,
and provide initial detection of UXOs. Utilizing MATLAB™, Python™, Google Earth™,
and the Skywalker’s telemetry logs, the secondary GCS operator is able to discriminate
between damage and UXOs as well as precisely geo-locate the objects appearing on the
airfield surfaces.
Phase one – “survey” – is complete when the Skywalker air vehicle has been
recovered and the secondary GCS operator has completed his/her post-processing of the
still images. The deliverables of this first phase are a digital MOS and plot of UXOs and
craters on a satellite image of the runway, as well as a set of waypoints that may then be
ingested back into Mission Planner™ for the second phase – “inspection” – to complete the
airfield damage assessment. In addition to the data collected for this thesis, fixed-wing air
vehicle component times and manpower requirements have been provided in Appendix K.
The second air vehicle employed in this thesis is a hex-framed, VTOL, multi-rotor
built on the TarotTM 960-millimeter, carbon-fiber frame (Figure 10). The structural
components used in this custom build include a Tarot T96013 foldable landing gear; a
Storm Pro-3, three-axis, universal camera gimbal; and carbon-fiber battery mounting rails.
The propulsion system includes six 465-kV brushless motors (KDE Direct, 2015)
individually linked to 95 Amp electronic speed controllers (KDE Direct, 2015) and driven
by 15-inch carbon-fiber, two-blade propellers (with a pitch of 5.5). This air vehicle is
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serviced by the Pixhawk™ 2.0 autopilot, a GPS receiver, two 6S 10,000 milliamp hour LiPo batteries wired in parallel (primary flight power source), and one 3S Li-Po battery (autopilot backup and gimbal power sources). Additional features include stiffened landing
gear, directional light-emitting diodes, and a Sony α6000 camera. Further hex-rotor air
vehicle configuration information can be found in Appendix I.

Figure 10. Tarot Hex-rotor, Storm Pro-3 Gimbal, & Sony α6000 Camera
The objective of the Tarot T960 build was to utilize the waypoints generated by the
Survey Phase to thoroughly inspect the airfield surfaces, thereby providing recovery teams
with high resolution images of the objects present on the airfield operating surfaces. This
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phase required an air vehicle to loiter about a waypoint long enough to collect sufficient
imagery, without distortion, and at a low enough altitude such that an acceptable ground
sampling distance (GSD) accommodates accurate UXO identification. These requirements
prohibited a fixed-wing air vehicle from fulfilling this aspect of the mission; therefore, the
hex-rotor was the ideal candidate.
A “hex” frame was chosen over a traditional “quad” – four arms – to achieve a
more stable imaging platform during windy or otherwise adverse environmental
conditions. Within the context of hobbyist drones, as the quantity of limbs supporting the
payload is reduced, fewer motors can be attached to the vehicle, thereby requiring a higher
thrust output per motor. This in turn develops a tendency to to produce oscillation along
members supporting motors and propellers. Given that the Tarot T960’s carbon fiber limbs
are 405 millimeters long (with a tube diameter of 25 millimeters), oscillatory effects are
magnified as thrust requirements increase. As such, the hex-frame provided a satisfactory
degree of rigidity and allowed for required thrust to be dispersed over additional members.
In addition, the hex-configuration provided redundancies in the event of partial propulsion
system failure. For this same reason, the hex was chosen over a co-axial quad-rotor due to
efficiency, thrust characterization, and mission endurance requirements. Specifically, in
terms of structural configuration, the quad-frame with co-axial motors tends to weight the
ends of each member to a greater extent than a single motor and propeller alone. This in
turn develops oscillation throughout propeller/motor supporting members and adversely
impacts air vehicle positioning consistency and forces image stabilizing devices (i.e.,
gimbals) to consume additional power to stabilize payloads during imaging operations.
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Upon completion of the Survey Phase, a GCS operator, a technician, and an SP
prepare the hex-rotor for launch. This entails a systems checkout of communications
equipment, the gimbal, imaging device, structural and propulsion components, and the
attachment of the required power supplies. System checkout and assembly required 5.15
minutes to complete. The SP then initiated a manual takeoff and achieved stable flight –
amounting to an additional 42 seconds – where he/she then turned the hex-rotor over to
“Auto Mode.” The hex-rotor then flew to the first waypoint (established in Mission
Planner™), hovered at 80 meters for five seconds, and collected three images. Once
complete, the hex-rotor resumed its course to the next waypoint – until all waypoints and
imaging commands had been fulfilled. When complete, the hex-rotor returned to the
launch point where it was recovered manually by the SP, whereupon the images were
manually recovered from the Sony α6000’s on-board Secure Digital (SD) card. In addition
to the data collected for this thesis, hex-rotor air vehicle component times and manpower
requirements have been provided in Appendix K.
The primary and secondary GCS operators reviewed the inspection phase imagery
and updated the survey phase damage plot. In accordance with AFPAM 10-219, Volume
4, the GCS operators identified which taxiways and parking areas best accommodated the
needs of the flying mission, thereby producing an acceptable MOS. This repair solution is
then delivered to Civil Engineer recovery teams such that assets, personnel, and equipment
may be mobilized to begin the airfield recovery process.
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IV. Analysis and Results

In this chapter, the baseline metrics will be compared to civil engineer officer
performance using the MATLAB™ GUI and the 2D ortho-mosaic. Recall that the baseline
test group consists of nine, four-person teams, dispersed over three separate evaluation
periods. From these trials, six metrics have been identified: 1) the average time required
to conduct an airfield assessment, 2) correct identification of damage, explosive hazards,
and debris, 3) quantity of explosive hazard false positives, 4) quantity of explosive hazard
false negatives, 5) object location conformance to Silver Flag test cards, and 6) object
location conformance with GPS.

The civil engineer officer data set consists of 25

independently observed analyses of aerial imagery using 1080p video captured images
presented within the MATLAB™ GUI interface (previously described) and a 2D orthomosaic composed of 46, 24-megapixel still images (previously described). CE officer
performance will be evaluated across the following metrics: 1) the average time required
to analyze airfield images, 2) correct identification of damage, explosive hazards, and
debris, and 3) quantity of explosive hazard false negatives. For this thesis approach, civil
engineer officer subjects were limited to the geo-location accuracy of the airfield images.
Therefore, location accuracy metrics were not measured against their performances.
Instead, a description will be provided outlining reasonable expectations for location
accuracy among the airfield images. In addition, airfield images did not contain craters or
spall fields; therefore, damage identification and position could not be measured.
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Baseline metrics
The following six metrics have been summarized in Appendix K.
Metric #1: assessment time and MOS plotting.
During the baseline evaluations, test subjects were not evaluated on damage
assessment duration. According to Abrego and Moore (2017), airfield assessments took
no less than 20 minutes and no longer than 30 minutes to complete. In addition, ADAT’s
remain in constant communication with the EOC throughout the airfield assessment; thus,
the MOS plotting team is able to annotate ADAT findings on a scaled airfield map as
damage and UXOs are identified. Therefore, damage and UXO plotting is completed when
the ADAT(s) finish their sweep of the airfield, thereby requiring no additional time. Lastly,
it is the author’s experience that, depending on the proficiency of the MOS plotting team,
identification of all potential MOS solutions and labeling of the three best candidates can
range between 5 to 15 minutes to complete. From this we arrive at a range of 25 to 45
minutes to complete an airfield damage assessment and MOS plotting via conventional
methods.
Metric #2: correct identification.
For the first five teams (evaluated August – October 2017), their exercises consisted
of eight objects per exercise, resulting in a total of 40 objects. For the latter four teams
(evaluated in December 2017), their exercises consisted of seven objects per exercise,
resulting in a total of 28 objects.
Across all nine evaluations, 68 objects (craters, spall fields, UXOs, and bomblet
fields) were present. 50 of the 68 total objects were correctly identified, thus producing a
73.5% correct identification rating. Within the first five assessments, however, the test
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administrator indicated that, due to the repeated use of the Silver Flag site, there was
confusion among teams regarding which objects were considered “in play” as opposed to
previous repairs (Abrego & Moore, 2017). Therefore, 13 of the misidentified objects could
have been seen, yet were not recorded. The results of the first five exercises produced a
67.5% correct identification rate (27 of 40 objects were correctly identified). To navigate
this, the third series of evaluations (the final four conducted in December of 2017), were
adequately briefed on existing conditions and what areas were testable. Familiarizing the
teams with the preexisting pavement conditions yielded an 89.3% identification rate (25 of
28 objects were identified). Of the object identified, 23 of 25 objects were correctly
identified, thereby producing a 92% correct identification rating (refer Appendix K).
Based on the difference between the first five teams’ performance and the latter four, the
former correct identification rating has been discarded.
Metric #3: quantity of explosive hazard false positives.
Across all nine evaluations, there were 36 objects classified as explosive hazards
(32 UXOs and four bomblet fields) and 32 objects classified as damage (18 craters and 14
spall fields). Across the nine teams, only two false positives occurred; two of the teams
misidentified a spall field as a bomblet field. Of the 68 total objects, this false positive
detection rating amounts to 3% of all objects identified (refer to Appendix K). For the
same reasons provided in the previous metric, due to test subject confusion regarding
damage in the first five evaluations, only the latter four exercises were considered in this
metric. Both false positive events occurred during these last four exercises, thus, two
explosive hazard false positives out of 28 objects demonstrates that, 7.1% of the time,
objects were misidentified as explosive hazards.
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Metric #4: quantity of explosive hazard false negatives.
Recall that, across all nine exercises, there were 36 explosive hazards placed upon
the runway (exercises one through five: 15 UXOs and five bomblet fields, exercises six
through nine: 16 UXOs). Only one of the 36 explosive hazards were overlooked; therefore,
a 2.78% false negative rating may be assigned to the explosive hazards category (refer to
Table 18 in Appendix K).
Metric #5: object location.
Damage located along the centerline of the runway ranged between 1.5 and 175
meters from the test administrators’ test cards. However, 25% of the time, centerline
positioning was within 10 meters of the test card. Positioning to-the-left or right of the
centerline ranged between zero and 7.6 meters, and 44% of the time, left-to-right
positioning was within 10 meters of the test cards. For explosive hazards, within the latter
four evaluations, there were four UXOs and four teams, amounting to sixteen objects.
UXOs located along the centerline of the runway ranged between zero and 15.2 meters of
the test cards, where 81% of the time, positioning was within 10 meters of the test cards.
UXOs located to-the-left or right of the centerline ranged between zero and 16.8 meters
from the test cards, where left-to-right position accuracy was within 10 meters 94% of the
time.
Metric #6: manual object locating versus GPS.
Error! Reference source not found. summarizes the centerline and left-to-right
position accuracy of the nine enlisted civil engineer teams. Compared to GPS positioning
accuracy, conventional methods produce results within 10 meters: 25% of the time for
damage along the centerline, 44% of the time for damage to-the-left or right of the
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centerline, 81% of the time for explosive hazards along the centerline, and 94% of the time
for explosive hazards to-the-left or right of the centerline. As per Table 6, however, the
conventional approach ranged up to 6.4 and 28.3 meters away from the true location along
the centerline for UXOs and damage, respectively.

Table 5. Position Accuracy Summary Table

Damage CL
UXO CL
GPS CL

<10m >10m Min (m) Max (m) Avg (m)
25% 75%
1.5
175
19.4
81% 19%
0
15.2
6.4
100% 0% << within 3-4 meters

Damage L/R
UXO L/R
GPS L/R

44% 56%
0
7.6
94% 6%
0
16.8
100% 0% << within 3-4 meters

1
1

Table 6. Baseline Positioning Deviation

Damage CL Accuracy
UXO CL Accuracy

feet
93.0
21.1

Damage L/R Accuracy
UXO L/R Accuracy

7.7
11.9

GPS (w/o correction) GPS (w/ correction)
meters
feet
meters
feet
meters
28.3
13.1
4.0
4.9
1.5
6.4
13.1
4.0
4.9
1.5
2.3
3.6

13.1
13.1

4.0
4.0

4.9
4.9

1.5
1.5

Baseline Data (Status Quo)

As can be seen in Table 2, centerline positioning within 10 meters is achieved to a
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greater degree for UXOs when compared to damage features. This may be due to the
method through which UXOs are located. Engineer Assistants (EAs) identify, categorize,
and locate pavement damage, whereas EOD Techs focus on explosive hazards. The EAs
use PRMS whereas the EOD Techs us the Military Grid Reference System (MGRS).
Comparing the two systems was not a planned outcome of this thesis; however, the
observed outcome suggests that the MGRS may be a more accurate tool to use.
Furthermore, when comparing the three approaches – PRMS, MGRS, and GPS – it is clear
that objects identified with a GPS unit (assuming a non-GPS denied environment and
without the inclusion of corrective devices) will produce a higher degree of location
accuracy. The improvement in location accuracy via GPS merits further investigation by
the civil engineering community. These metrics are summarized in Appendix G and
Appendix J.
Civil engineer officer metrics
The following three metrics have been summarized in Appendix K.
Metric #1: airfield assessment time.
The minimum assessment times for the MATLAB GUI and 2D ortho-mosaic were
95 seconds and 61 seconds, respectively. The maximum assessment times were 370
seconds and 354 seconds, respectively. Within the 2D ortho-mosaic dataset, a 600 second
outlier was eliminated. The mean assessment times were 217 seconds and 203.4 seconds,
respectively. In the following metric, evidence suggesting that time plays an insignificant
role will be supported via their respective R2 values and Pearson Correlation coefficients.
In Table 7, a summary of assessment times has been provided. In addition, linear

63

extrapolations for a 3,000-meter runway have also been included.

Table 7. Image Analysis vs. Status Quo Assessment Time Summary Table
217m Sample (WPAFB, Ohio)
3,000m (Silver Flag, TAFB, Florida)
Minimum (min) Average (min) Maximum (min) Minimum (min) Average (min) Maximum (min)
Baseline
---20
25
30
MATLAB GUI
1.58
3.62
6.17
21.89
50.00
85.25
2D Ortho-mosaic
1.02
3.65
10.00
14.06
50.46
138.25
*Linearly Extroplated

Based upon the average amount of time spent processing images for each of the
approaches, collective assessment times have been detailed in Appendix J. Composite
times amounted to 93.8 minutes to assemble, launch, survey, and analyze images using the
MATLAB approach, and 102 minutes to do the same using the hex-rotor. The researcher
hypothesizes that data analysis time can be reduced with the inclusion of outsourcing and
sectoring fields of regard. A greater number of personnel reviewing small sets of images
promises to both 1) increase correct object detection performance/decrease false negative
performance and 2) reduce data analysis time.
Metric #2: correct identification of objects.
For both the MATLAB GUI and 2D Ortho-mosaic, each of the 25 subjects had
eight objects to identify. Thus, across all evaluations, there were 200 total objects. The
number of objects correctly identified ranged 1-6 out of eight for the MATLAB GUI; 83
of the 200 objects were correctly identified (41.5%). I n relation to analysis time versus
correct object identification, the MATLAB R2 value was 0.0289. For the 2D ortho-mosaic,
correct identification ranged 3-7 out of eight objects; 151 of the 200 objects were correctly
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identified (75.5%). Similarly, analysis times versus correct identification produced an R2
value of 0.0169.
The MATLAB GUI’s R2 value unequivocally demonstrates that time and correct
identification performance do not interact.

The Pearson coefficient confirms this

(amounting to 0.17), indicating that time has a weak, positive linear correlation with correct
identification performance.

This suggests that, although time makes a microscopic

contribution to object identification in the MATLAB GUI, other factors are more likely
candidates for effecting correct identification performance. Similarly, the 2D ortho-mosaic
R2 value demonstrates a less significant interaction between image analysis time and
correct identification performance. The Pearson coefficient amounts to 0.1699, which also
approximates zero (no correlation).
Metric #3: false negative UXO detection.
For the MATLAB GUI, UXO false negative detection ranged from 1-7, whereas
the 2D Ortho-mosaic ranged from 1-5 of the eight objects placed on the runway. The
average false negative rates were 4.4 (117 of 200, or 58.5%) and 2.0 (49 of 200, or 24.5%)
respectively (refer to Appendix J for the civil engineer officer responses). In the MATLAB
GUI, the R2 value is 0.0089, demonstrating that time has an insignificant effect on UXO
false negative performance.

Moreover, the Pearson coefficient amounts to -0.0943

(approximately zero), which indicates that time and false negative performance do not
show a significant correlation.
Similarly, in the 2D ortho-mosaic, the R2 value is 0.1937, which demonstrates a
modest correlation between time and false negative performance. However, the Pearson
coefficient in this second approach amounts to -0.4402, which shows a weak-moderate,
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negative linear (or inverse) correlation; as assessment time increases, false negative
performance improves (the occurrence of false negatives decreases) to a moderate degree.
Between the MATLAB GUI and the 2D ortho-mosaic and their nearly identical assessment
times, these relationships indicate that factors other than assessment time (such as the
higher image resolution provided by the 2D ortho-mosaic) are more likely to affect false
negative performance.
For the MATLAB GUI, 56 pavement features were incorrectly identified as a UXO
and 58.5% of the time, analysts failed to identify the presence of a UXO. For the 2D orthomosaic, despite spending a comparable amount of time analyzing imagery, analysts
identified 30 more pavement features as UXOs than in the MATLAB GUI. Finally, 24.5%
of the time, subjects analyzing the 2D ortho-mosaic failed to identify the presence of a
UXO.
Status quo hypothesis tests.
The performance of the MATLAB GUI and the 2D ortho-mosaic methods were
evaluated against the baseline using single-tail t-tests. Due to differences in populations
performing the CE officer assessments and the baseline assessments, independent means
testing must be conducted. The performance of each test is as follows (and are summarized
in Appendix K):
MATLAB GUI vs. Status Quo: Pure Object False Negative Detection. The mean
false negative of the status quo is 0.2059, whereas the MATLAB GUI mean is 4.68. With
significance level of 0.05, the test-statistic is 9.869, whereas the critical value is -1.711;
therefore, in accordance with the critical value approach, the null hypothesis is rejected in
favor of the alternative: the average false negatives for MATLAB were greater than the
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status quo.
2D Ortho-mosaic vs. Status Quo: Pure Object False Negative Detection. The mean
false negative of the 2D ortho-mosaic is 1.96. With significance level of 0.05, the teststatistic is 4.610, whereas the critical value is -1.711; therefore, in accordance with the
critical value approach, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative: the
average false negatives for the 2D ortho-mosaic were greater than the status quo.
MATLAB GUI vs. Status Quo: Explosive Hazard False Positive Detection Rate.
The mean false positive of the status quo is 0.0299, whereas the MATLAB GUI mean is
2.24. With significance level of 0.05, the test-statistic is -0.558, whereas the critical value
is -1.976; therefore, in accordance with the critical value approach, the null hypothesis is
rejected in favor of the alternative: the average false positives for MATLAB were greater
than the status quo.
2D Ortho-mosaic vs. Status Quo: Explosive Hazard False Positive Detection Rate.
The mean false positive of the 2D ortho-mosaic is 3.44. With significance level of 0.05,
the test-statistic is 0.679, whereas the critical value is -1.976; therefore, in accordance with
the critical value approach, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative: the
average false positives for the 2D ortho-mosaic were greater than the status quo.
MATLAB GUI vs. Status Quo: Incorrect Object Identification Rate. The mean
incorrect identification rate of the status quo is 0.0556, whereas the MATLAB GUI mean
is 4.68. With significance level of 0.05, the test-statistic is 9.869, whereas the critical value
is -1.654; therefore, in accordance with the critical value approach, the null hypothesis is
rejected in favor of the alternative: the average number of incorrectly identified objects for
MATLAB were greater than the status quo.
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2D Ortho-mosaic vs. Status Quo: Incorrect Object Identification Rate. The mean
incorrect identification rate of the 2D ortho-mosaic is 1.96. With significance level of 0.05,
the test-statistic is 4.610, whereas the critical value is -1.654; therefore, in accordance with
the critical value approach, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative: the
average number of incorrectly identified objects for the 2D ortho-mosaic were greater than
the status quo.
Civil engineer officer hypothesis tests.
The performance of the MATLAB GUI and the 2D ortho-mosaic methods were
evaluated against each other using single tail t-tests. Dependent means testing could be
performed due to the shared use of test subject populations.
MATLAB vs. 2D Ortho-mosaic: Pure Object Detection False Negatives. In Table
8, the resulting performance between the MATLAB GUI and the 2D ortho-mosaic for pure
object false detection and incorrect identification have been summarized.

With a

significance level of 0.05, the mean false negative detection rate for the 2D ortho-mosaic
was 1.96, whereas the MATLAB GUI exhibited an average of 4.68 false negatives. The
test-statistic is 9.869, whereas the critical value is -1.654; therefore, in accordance with the
critical value approach, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative: the
average number of false negatives for the MATLAB GUI were greater than the 2D orthomosaic.
MATLAB vs. 2D Ortho-mosaic: Incorrect Object Identification Rate. With a
significance level of 0.05, the mean false negative detection rate for the 2D ortho-mosaic
was 1.96, whereas the MATLAB GUI exhibited an average of 4.68 objects incorrectly
identified. The test-statistic is 9.869, whereas the critical value is -1.654; therefore, in
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accordance with the critical value approach, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the
alternative: the average number of incorrectly identified objects for the MATLAB GUI
were greater than the 2D ortho-mosaic.

Table 8. MATLAB vs. 2D Ortho-mosaic Statistics
MATLAB vs. 2D Ortho: Pure Object False
Negative Detection Rate
Mean
4.68
Standard Error
0.314749
Median
5
Mode
6
Standard Deviation
1.573743
Alpha
0.05
Ho: MATLAB <=
1.9600
Ha: MATLAB >
1.9600
Range
5
Minimum
2
Maximum
7
Sum
117
Count (n)
25
Degrees of Freedom
24.00
t-Statistic
9.869
p-Value
1.000
Critical Value
-1.711
Goal: find evidence suggesting that the avg qty of
false neg detection for MATLAB is <= the 2D
MATLAB vs. 2D Ortho: T-Stat (9.869) > Critical
Value (-1.711); therefore, Reject Ho

MATLAB vs. 2D Ortho: Object Incorrect
Identification Rate
Mean
4.68
Standard Error
0.314749
Median
3
Mode
2
Standard Deviation
1.573743
Alpha
0.05
Ho: MATLAB <=
1.9600
Ha: MATLAB >
1.9600
Range
1
Minimum
6
Maximum
83
Sum
25
Count (n)
24
Degrees of Freedom
23.00
t-Statistic
9.869
p-Value
1.000
Critical Value
-1.714
Goal: find evidence suggesting that the avg qty of
incorrect identifications for 2D are <= MATLAB
MATLAB vs. 2D Ortho: T-Stat (9.869) > Critical
Value (-1.711); therefore, Reject Ho

Positioning accuracy.
Throughout the civil engineer officer evaluations, positioning accuracy along the
centerline or to-the-left or right of the centerline was not measured. However, the
differences between baseline positioning accuracy and GPS accuracy was discussed in the
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baseline metrics. Recall that, centerline positioning ranged from 6.4 to 28.3 meters away
from the true location, whereas left-to-right positioning ranged from 2.3-3.6 meters away
from true. Furthermore, that objects were located along the centerline to less than 10
meters away from true 25-81% of the time, whereas objects were located to the left or right
of the centerline less than 10 meters away 44-94% of the time. Contrast these performances
with that of GPS location accuracy. According to NAVSTAR (2008), GPS is accurate to
within 3-5 meters of a known location without the inclusion of corrections such as Real
Time Kinematics (RTK) and surveyed reference points. Compared to baseline results, GPS
offers the ability to improve object positioning up to 550%.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

In culmination of this thesis, the preceding sections provide evidence for the
investigative questions, which provide support for the following conclusions: that Small
Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) may provide engineers with a promising alternative to
conventional airfield damage and repair methods. In addition, recommendations in support
of fielding SUAS for airfield damage assessment are provided. Lastly, topics for further
research into air vehicle and sensor package optimization are discussed.
First investigative question
Are civil engineer personnel capable of reliably leveraging data collected via SUAS
to meet or exceed traditional damage assessment methods?
Given the resulting performance of the MATLAB™ GUI and the 2D ortho-mosaic
map detailed in Chapter IV, Air Force civil engineers cannot fully replace traditional
airfield damage assessment methods with this thesis’ configuration; however, it comes
close. Recall that, for the baseline metrics (status quo), correct object detection was 92%
and false negative events occurred 2.8% of the time. The correct object identification for
MATLAB GUI and 2D ortho-mosaic were 41.5% and 75.5%, respectively, whereas their
false negative occurrences were 58.5% and 24.5%, respectively.

In this thesis, the

MATLAB GUI was used to provide an overview of the damaged features, foreign objects,
and explosive hazards present on a section of a runway. The researcher hypothesizes that
the lesser image resolution, coupled with the inability to magnify images resulted in a
greater occurrence of false negatives. The second interface (2D ortho-mosaic) provided a
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higher resolution snapshot of the waypoints produced by the former. Thus, with a 41.5%
correct identification level, engineers were at least provided with an area to further
evaluate. This in turn, resulted in a 34% increase in identification and a 30% decrease in
the occurrence of false negative events.
Between the identification level of the status quo and the 2D ortho-mosaic, the
difference of 6.5% amounts to missing 6.6 objects per 100, whereas the MATLAB GUI
amounts to missing 41 objects per 100. Suffice it to say, a 6.5% decrease in object
identification as well as a 55.7 and 21.7% increase in the occurrence of false negatives for
MATLAB and the 2D ortho-mosaic, respectively are considerable hurdles. Despite the
object detection limitations experienced with this thesis’ configuration, the 1.0-5.56 times
greater location accuracy along the centerline provided by SUAS demonstrates that this
approach has value and merits further investigation. Finally, the total time required to
conduct a 217-meter airfield damage assessment using a fixed-wing SUAS approach
resulted in 18.7 minutes to complete, whereas a hex-rotor, 2D ortho-mosaic approach
resulted in 26.1 minutes to complete. Using linear extrapolation to scale the 217-meter test
sample to match the 3,000-meter sample used in the enlisted civil engineer baseline
metrics, the airfield assessment times are estimated to be 93.8 minutes and 102 minutes,
respectively (refer to Table 19 in Appendix K). Compared to the status quo, the average
assessment time ranges between 20-30 minutes to complete with MOS plotting and
deliberating requiring an addition 5-15 minutes. By contrast, the fixed-wing approach
doubles this time whereas the hex-rotor scales it by a factor of 2.25.
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Second investigative question
What are the resource requirements – e.g. manpower, purchase costs, consumables,
etc. – for an SUAS concept to accomplish an airfield damage assessment?
Numerous AFIT trials and experimentation with SUAS has demonstrated that each
aerial vehicle has its specific supporting requirements. However, in general, the use of
SUAS is supported by the following manpower, equipment and consumable requirements.
Manpower.
Each aerial vehicle requires, at a minimum, three personnel to operate: one ground
control station (GCS) operator, one safety pilot (SP), and one observer/technician (paired
with the SP to assist with visual confirmation and verbal communications back to the GCS
operator). This process could be repeated for subsequent air vehicle launches up to the
limit capabilities of the GCS(s), GCS operators, and safety pilot confidence, thereby
enabling swarm operations. In addition, for aerial assets of substantial size, additional
personnel may be required to perform maintenance operations on active and inactive air
vehicles including: exchanging and charging batteries, hand or catapult launching nonrolling takeoff vehicles, and assembling/disassembling support apparatus (such as a
catapult launcher).
Equipment.
Each aerial vehicle is serviced by a launching device, GCS, and remote controller.
Depending on the vehicle type, a launching device may not be required. However, as has
been used by this thesis, the fixed-wing surveyor was designed as a catapult launch vehicle.
This was to account for the potential non-availability of a suitable surface for a rolling
takeoff, as well as improve stability in the air and mission endurance time without the
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added drag and weight of landing gear. The accompanying GCS runs mission planning
software that collects telemetry logs (time, GPS location, body positioning/angles,
acceleration, velocity, etc.) and plans – as well as executes – predefined missions. In this
thesis, the GCS operated using Mission Planner™ software. Further details of the fixedwing air vehicle’s video subsystem configuration are provided in Appendix I. Finally, the
remote controller used in this thesis was an FrSky Electronics Co., Taranis, with a 2.4GHz
Digital Telemetry Radio System. This device allowed the safety pilot to take manual
control over the air vehicle through the launch and recovery stages as well as override the
mission plan should the vehicle begin to perform erratically or uncharacteristically. Lastly,
this device provides full control of pitch, yaw, roll, air speed, and tuning presets.
Consumables.
The expendable materials used to support SUAS operations include fasteners,
adhesives, and power supply sources. Due to air vehicle design, the vibration applied to
the vehicle frame and subcomponents requires periodic adjustment to ensure proper fit and
air worthiness.

As such, consumables included zip-ties, Lock-Tite™, rapid setting

adhesives (i.e., Super Glue™), and replacement fastening screws. In addition, the power
supply units were a combination of Lithium-Polymer (“Li-Po”) and Nickel-Cadmium (“NiCad”) rechargeable battery packs. Depending on the mission duration, to ensure optimum
performance, battery packs were replaced between each takeoff and landing.
Third investigative question
Given the target criteria specified in the problem statement, what sensor packages,
aerial vehicle characteristics, and environmental optimization considerations that are
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appropriate to assessing airfield damage assessments?
In this thesis, two sensor packages were investigated within the area of image-based
sensors. In the fixed-wing, MATLAB™ approach, a 1080p video stream (scaled down by
20%) was used to capture still images – with a 40% overlap – while the air vehicle was in
motion (approximately 15 meters per second) at an altitude of 40 meters (+/-1 meter). The
second air vehicle utilized a two-axis (pitch and yaw) gimbal stabilized, 24-megapixel
camera (yielding a 21.3-megapixel image), affixed to a hex-rotor hovering at an airspeed
of zero meters-per-second and an altitude of 80 meters (+/- 1 meter). As per the findings
discussed in Chapter IV, both sensor packages were successful in identifying a percentage
of objects placed upon the airfield surface.

However, the 24-megapixel camera

demonstrated a significantly greater degree of detection accuracy.
As discussed in the previous chapter, visual sensor packages – while useful for
conducting minimum threat/low operational tempo missions – are insufficient when used
alone for the purpose of airfield damage assessment. This thesis did not start with an image
resolution goal in mind. Based on the findings, future tests should strive for greater
resolution than the 2D ortho-mosaic. It is recommended that either a higher resolution
camera or a secondary (multi-spectral) sensor be incorporated in future trials. A relevant
sensor package that can assist in the detection rate of objects placed upon the airfield
surface is an Infrared (IR) sensor.
The fixed-wing air vehicle used in this thesis required an imaging device that could
be synchronized to the airspeed of the vehicle. Common approaches to this form of
imaging are either the use of an intervalometer affixed to a camera or – as was implemented
in this thesis – a Python™ script that took screen captures from the live video stream and
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coupled them with telemetry information. The amount of lift produced by the Skywalker
X8 frame and light weight ensured ample mission endurance and in-flight stability. For
the hex-rotor, the 2D ortho-mosaic required the air vehicle to remain motionless – in pitch,
yaw, and roll, as well as in the north, east, and downward directions. This is a requirement
that cannot be met by typical fixed-wing air vehicles; therefore, the multi-rotor – whether
that be a tri-, quad-, hex-, or octo-rotor – was the only choice. Image stabilization and
clarity is the primary factor in deciding the final configuration of the multi-rotor. As such,
a hex-rotor (six arms, one motor per arm) was the best of both worlds in terms of the quadcopter’s endurance and the octo-copter’s stability in hover.
The airfield damage assessment mission required full coverage of all aircraft
operating surfaces. This includes parking aprons, taxiways, and runways. As such, launch,
mission execution, and recovery must account for the total endurance required to cover the
combined airfield features (previously identified). Optimization would require an efficient
flight pattern such that wasted flight time is kept to a minimum. In addition, with lower
kV motors, larger propellers, and higher capacity batteries, inflight endurance may be
increased. Lastly, to ensure optimum performance, the connection from the GCS to the air
vehicle must remain intact. As such, signal boosting infrastructure or, at the very least,
rapidly deployable signal boosting systems, must be in place to allow for full coverage of
the airfield operating surfaces. The system used in this thesis had an advertised range of
1,000 meters (radially). This signal range was untested; however, video dropout began to
occur roughly two-thirds of the way down the remaining length of runway, which was
approximately 1,500 meters.
For austere environments, final configuration of an SUAS will vary by the region
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of concern. For hotter climates – such as the Middle East –the presence of fine particulate
dust will be a maintenance consideration for operating in desert environments. In arctic
climates – such as Thule, Greenland – operations may experience degraded pitot sensor
performance for fixed-wing air vehicles. Lastly, for high-wind climates, motor kV ratings
and propeller configurations may require optimization. In addition, moisture barriers may
be required for frequently precipitous environments.

Each of these additions will

ultimately lead to greater vehicle mass and maintenance considerations. With greater mass,
a more powerful motor and/or propeller configuration, a higher capacity power source to
sustain its operation, or the inclusion of additional air vehicles will be required.
Summary
The use of remote sensing technologies (to include SUAS) provides Air Force civil
engineers with a multitude of benefits. While SUAS approaches investigated in this thesis
may not meet or exceed the status quo, their manpower conservation is a considerable
factor favoring their adoption. The Sinclair approach (Shepherd & Storm, 2017d), as well
as the method leveraged by this thesis, reduces the ADAT team requirements by 75%. In
addition, these modern approaches to solving airfield damage assessment and UXO
identification promise to improve civil engineer safety by mitigating and nearly eliminating
boots on ground presence.

From this perspective, post kinetic- and/or Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) attack events become much
safer for civil engineers to begin the base recovery process.
With respect to the ability of SUAS to accomplish airfield damage assessment as
well as UXO identification and classification missions, AFCEC (RADAS) data as well as
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AFIT preliminary experimentation has shown the 2D ortho-mosaic approach to be a
promising solution. This technique could be further improved through reductions in
Ground Sampling Distance (GSD), inclusion of surveyed Ground Control Points, 3D
Digital Elevation Mapping, or the implementation of other sensors. Using overhead
imagery with geolocation, the size, quantity, and depth of both large and small craters, as
well as spall fields, UXOs, and bomblet fields, can be reliably identified using post image
processing. Unfortunately, an algorithm to automate this process and identify features of
interest continues to demonstrate inconsistent results (Filler & Diltz, 2016). This thesis
has provided an interface utilizing MATLAB to digest the fixed-wing video feed, which,
in conjunction with Installation Commander (ICC) defined aircraft parameters, can
produce a single, optimal solution for the location of the MOS. However, this does not
account for the AFPAM 10-219, Volume 4 stipulation that MOS selection teams must
produce three candidate MOSs for ICC consideration and final approval. Marginally, UXO
identification and classification is dependent upon the color and size of the UXO in relation
to the image resolution of images collected. Objects painted in neutral colors that blend
into native vegetation remain just as challenging – if not more so – to identify via SUAS
using still images as they are for personnel conducting damage assessments manually.
With these two facets combined (damage detection, location, and quantification, as well as
UXO detection, classification, and location), while the minimum operating strip may be
easier to identify via remote sensing or SUAS techniques, the identification and
classification of UXOs remains a daunting challenge.
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Recommendations
With respect to the findings of this thesis, a case for the employment of SUAS
during airfield damage assessment can effectively be made. First, the Air Force should
invest in strategies to remotely detect UXOs without the use of visual identification. This
leverages the advantages in manpower efficiency and safety that SUAS use provides. In
addition, it underscores the fact that a visual sensor package alone leaves room for
improvement (as is often the case in manual methods). Second, SUAS should be applied
to the airfield damage assessment mission as it has demonstrated the capacity to save time,
improve sizing and location accuracy, and significantly reduce the risk to base recovery
personnel. In addition, visual outputs from SUAS can be a great asset to personnel
producing MOS solutions remotely (i.e., Emergency Operations Centers and/or Damage
Control Centers). Moreover, the usefulness of SUAS does not only apply to airfield
damage assessment. The versatility of SUAS suggests that they should also be applied to
infrastructure assessments, including vehicle pavement surveys (Grandsaert, 2015;
Schleppi, 2018) and exterior facility assessments following storms (Meeks, 2016), as well
as a host of other applications currently being investigated in the private sector.
Lastly, due to the inclusion of AFCEC’s RADAS project in Air Force Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-32.11, SUAS use in future civil engineer
operations will be an eventuality. At the present time, the expected delivery and associated
training dates for the RADAS system are unknown. As an interim improvement, it is
recommended that the damage plotting algorithm used in this thesis be applied to current
Air Force procedures to enhance and expedite MOS and MAOS identification and
selection.
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Further Research
Baseline study and airfield imaging.
A retrial of the baseline experiment is in order. Given the learning curve that
occurred between the first five baseline evaluations and the latter four, better methods
should be implemented to improve assessment data quality. An area that needs to be
addressed are the individual ADAT airfield assessment times. In the data provided by the
Silver Flag exercises, each team’s time to conduct the airfield assessment was omitted. In
addition, the time it took for the team to respond, process the airfield information, and
generate MOS plots was missing. Future studies should incorporate these component times
to provide greater context for airfield assessment accuracy and time resource requirements.
In addition, the original intent of this thesis was to assess an airfield using the status quo
concurrently with the SUAS approach. Further experimentation should strive to merge the
evaluation schedule with the SUAS team such that baseline metrics will be collected on
the same configuration of pavement damage and explosive hazards and under the same
climatological conditions as the SUAS team.
MATLAB and 2D ortho-mosaic testing.
For future trials, test subjects should be made familiar with the conditions of the
airfield prior to placement of UXOs and damage and the use of CE officers should be
avoided. In a real-world scenario, the personnel performing airfield damage assessments
will have a general concept of various pavement and infrastructure features that were
present prior to an attack. In addition, EAs and EOD Techs should be used to determine
performance of each airfield data analysis method. Civil Engineer officers are provided
with a general knowledge of how airfield damage assessments are performed; however,
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their knowledge and proficiency are not maintained throughout their careers. The greatest
exposure they receive is a general overview during their triennial Silver Flag encampment,
which is merely informative in nature. Future assessments would benefit from utilizing
the personnel who conduct airfield damage assessments regularly.
Air vehicle modifications.
An available candidate for further research is modifying the air vehicles used in this
thesis’ data collection (Appendix I), followed by a reimaging of the Wright Patterson, Area
B airfield. The author theorizes that, if the 24-megapixel Sony camera were to be fixed to
the underside of the fixed-wing air vehicle, and airspeed and altitude were optimized to
conform to the Sony α6000’s shutter speed, reduced mission times and higher image
resolution would surely result. Alternatively, the hex-rotor air vehicle would benefit from
a lower kV rated motor and larger propeller combination (assuming that electronic speed
controllers suit motor voltage requirements). This modification would enable greater
payloads to be carried (i.e., larger sensors) or greater distances to be flown, thus enabling
a complete imaging of an airfield section. This thesis’ performance was obtained solely
by leveraging still imagery that was collected from a single pointing angle at 80 meters
above the pavement surface. Had multiple perspectives been gathered, the mission been
flown at a lower altitude, and access to photogrammetric software (i.e., Pix4D™), civil
engineer officers would have a greater degree of image resolution at their disposal as well
as a 3D digital elevation map with which their efforts would be vastly improved. These
changes promise improved hazard detection as well as enhanced object location and sizing
accuracy.
Finally, a combination of approaches could be applied; utilize the hex-rotor at a
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lower altitude, operated in the same manner as the fixed-wing air vehicle. The author
hypothesizes that, given a moderate air speed, the hex-rotor could be used to collect a series
of images covering two lengths of the runway (one in either direction) in less than 20
minutes, thereby producing a higher resolution 2D ortho-mosaic or a 3D digital elevation
map.
Communications systems and equipment.
The methods used by the SUAS team that supplied airfield data to this thesis used
a line-of-sight, short range SUAS configuration. In an operational scenario, the SUAS
would need to traverse the entire airfield. Some airbases have runways two miles long.
Others have multiple runway surfaces and extensive taxiways to munitions storage
locations. The live video subsystem used on the fixed-wing air vehicle for this thesis had
an estimated range of 1,000 meters (radially). Towards the upper limits of that range, video
feed suffered considerable lag. Moreover, outside of that range, video feed became
unavailable for the ground station operator. Additionally, although data is collected at
1080p, it is not guaranteed to meet that resolution once it has been transmitted to image
analysis terminals. Therefore, if the thesis approach is to be applied in an operational
capacity, signal boosting infrastructure or equipment is an essential field that needs to be
studied. Subsequent to these limits, an investigation of data management must also be
undertaken.
Due to the high storage capacity requirements of a 1080p live video feed (estimated
three to five gigabytes per minute), the SUAS team made the decision to omit recording
the video feed. Instead, they designed an input method to trigger the camera to collect a
series of still images when they were passing a particular section of the runway. If images
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are to be coupled with telemetry logs over a full-sized runway (including adjacent spaces),
a greater emphasis must be placed on data management and post-processing techniques.
Finally, efforts to optimize image analysis tools and techniques must be
investigated. For the dataset leveraged by this thesis, image analysis occurred on the flight
line, in an open environment, under a cloth cover. Deleterious effects of glare, an unclean
monitor, and peripheral distractions contribute to higher false negatives and poor object
identification. Latter trials placed analysts in a dark room, however, ambient light, dirty
computer screens, and other non-sterile experimental conditions (i.e., noise) contributed to
erroneous data points and experiment inconsistency. Therefore, all image analysis must
occur in a darkened room, removed from outside noise and visual disturbance. In addition,
images must be presented on a clean monitor that is in good working condition (devoid of
any horizontal or vertical defects), is of sufficient size – monitors with a greater diagonal
measurement (17 inches or greater) tend to produce better results, and complete with fullspectrum back lighting, such as a Light Emitting Diode (LED) backlit, Liquid-Crystal
Display (LCD). The LED-LCD monitor allow for higher contrast between the brightest
and darkest aspects of imagery. In addition, LED backlit monitors provide a greater degree
of control of the backlight (Morrison, 2013) thereby allowing for improved user-system
integration.
Positioning systems.
The SUAS employed in this thesis used the Pixhawk 2.0 and standard GPS unit.
Previous AFIT experimentation determined that air vehicle body angle and location
accuracy was known to be within 1-2 degrees and three meters of the true location,
respectively. For a visual sensor package, these two factors combined reduce positional
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confidence to 10 meters (at best). To combat this, the combination of differential GPS,
such as RTK, and previously surveyed ground features may deliver a greater level of
location accuracy for individual pixels displayed on aerial images. Instead of a positional
confidence of within 10 meters, the inclusion of these methods have the potential to
increase positional confidence to within one meter. These improvements would contribute
to producing more accurate depictions of airfield surface conditions and lead to
optimization of MOS solutions, repair priorities, and precise locations of explosive
hazards.
Sensor packages.
Further research into the optimum sensor packages will be required. This thesis’
approach leveraged a 1080p live video stream and a 24 megapixel still camera. Each could
benefit from variation in their implementation (i.e., orientation, altitude, shutter speed, data
transfer, etc.).

In addition, other sensors are prime candidates for airfield damage

assessment, such as Infra-Red/Multi-spectral (Filler & Diltz, 2016), Sonar, piezoelectric
transducers (Alavi et al., 2015), magnetometers, or combinations. Moreover, with the
inclusion of multi-spectral sensing (e.g., Infra-Red, Sonar, etc.), data collected would
benefit from additional filters for analysts to refine their assessments.
UXO detection in vegetated areas.
This thesis focused on objects placed upon paved surfaces to the exclusion of
surrounding areas. As such, continuation efforts must consider adjacent spaces, to include
grass, sand, gravel, unrefined earth, and other ground coverings accompanying airfield
paved surfaces. The author hypothesizes that objects located in vegetated areas may be
more easily identified using IR and magnetometers.
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Surface and subsurface damage.
This thesis focused on explosive hazard detection and optimal MOS plotting. The
identification of surface and subsurface damage (i.e., camouflets and concealed cavities)
was not included in the dataset used for this thesis. Future experimentation should combine
efforts with the Silver Flag to image craters, spall fields, and subsurface damage indicators.
Due to their application in locating submarines during the Second World War as well as
continuing use for locating mineral and petroleum deposits, the author hypothesizes that
magnetometers would be an effective solution for identifying subsurface UXOs.
Environmental conditions.
Finally, design accommodation for climatological considerations (i.e., extreme
heat/cold and inclement weather) will require investigation prior to fielding SUAS in
austere locations. Specifically, for a desert climate, the ability to withstand fine particulate
matter (dust) is required. For precipitous environments, weather sealants will need to
include water proofing and/or vapor barriers. Overall, as a general consideration, air
vehicle designs must consider sensor stabilization performance improvements to account
for sporadic wind gusts and turbulent air as well as communications systems optimization.
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Appendix A. R-1, R-2, and R-3 Vehicle and Equipment Sets
(AFPAM 10-219, Volume 4)

Table 9. R-1 Equipment and Vehicle Set
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Table 10. R-2 Equipment and Vehicle Set Additives

Table 11. R-3 Equipment and Vehicle Set Additives
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Appendix B. Airfield Damage Reconnaissance Organization Concept
(AFPAM 10-219, Volume 4)

Figure 11. Airfield Damage Reconnaissance Organizational Concept
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Appendix C. Emergency Operations Center Team Organization
(AFPAM 10-219, Volume 4)

Figure 12. Emergency Operations Center Team Organization
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Appendix D. Types of Pavement Damage
(AFPAM 10-219, Volume 4)

Figure 13. Airfield Damage Classifications
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Appendix E. UXO Classifications
(AFPAM 10-219, Volume 3)

Figure 14. Class A (Bombs & Dispensers) & Class B (Rockets & Missiles) UXOs
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Figure 15. Class C UXOs (Projectiles & Mortars)

Figure 16. Class D UXOs (Land Mines)

92

Figure 17. Class E UXOs (Bomblets)

Figure 18. Class F UXOs (Rocket-Propelled Grenades & Hand Grenades)
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Appendix F. MOS Selection Checklist, Desirable- & Undesirable Considerations

1
2
3
4

5

6
7
8

9

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

MOS Selection Checklist
Are MOSs available that are on the centerline and at either end of the original runway?
Crater and spall repairs ‐ how many and what size? (A MOS location that involves the
least number and smallest size craters and spall sis usally the most attractive option)
Are there longer or wider MOSs than ICC requirements, but do not require additional
repairs?
Are there MOSs that have expansion potential, yet require limited additonal repairs?
UXO: a.) Are there any UXO or bomblet fields that exclude a candidate MOS from further
consideration (large buried bombs that will require excavation)?; b.) Will in‐place
detonation make the option worse? c.) Are bomblets so heavily mixed with crater debris
that clearance will be too slow? d.) Has time delay for start of crater repair necessitated
by UXO clearance been estimated?
Have shortest access routes been chosen consistent with the degree of repairs required?
Are access/egress routes positioned close to the end of the MOS? (At least two routes
are desired, with minimal MOS back‐taxiing requirements)
Existing MOS: a.) Is there an existing MOS? b.) Is it still operable? c.) Can it be made
operable with minimal repair and marking?
Can a MOS be made operable by altering operational requirements (types of aircraft
expected to use the MOS, gross weights, use of arresting system, unidirectional vs.
bidirectional operations, etc.)? Consult with director of operations or supervisor of
flying & notify wing commander of possibilities.
Arresting System: a.) Is an arresting system required for operations? b.) Is there a MOS
candidate that includes an in‐place arresting system? Is candidate MOS centered
sufficiently with pendant to permit proper arresting system operation? c.) Is there
sufficent crater free pavement on both sides of the arresting system? d.) Is a MAAS
available?
How well trained are ADR teams? Can they complete damage repair in the 4 hours
criterion?
What is the condition of the troops (fatigue, morale, attrition, etc.)?
What is the current condition of the ADR equipment?
What is the Chemical‐Biological‐Radiological‐Nuclear (CBRN) state?
What are the environmental factors (weather, lighting, etc.)?
What is the possibility of reattack?
Navigational Aids: a.) Will the MOS location allow the use of existing NAVAIDS? b.) Are
NAVAIDS needed? c.) Are existing NAVAIDS operational?

Figure 19. Minimum Operating Strip Selection Checklist
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Desireable MOS Selection Aspects
Crater locations on MOS that facilitate repair in pairs rather than single repairs may be
desirable to reduce crater repair times. (RQC will normally be more restrictive for
closely spaced craters).
MOS aligned on existing centerline to reduce marking time and take advantage of
surfiving NAVAIDS.
MOS with one end (either threshold or departure) situated on threshold of the original
runway.
A MOS that can utilize an existing in‐place arresting system.
Craters which are located close to material stockpiles.
A MOS with access/egress routes at each end.
A MOS with a minimal number of crater repair locations.
A MOS with dimensions longer and wider than the nominal 5,000' by 50'.

Figure 20. Desirable Minimum Operating Strip Selection Aspects

1
2
3
4
5
6

Undesireable MOS Selection Aspects
Craters located so close together that there is no clear working space around them.
More craters, spalls, & UXO than a full ADR team can handle in a 4‐hour time frame.
Craters within the first & last 1,000 feet of the MOS (these are the takeoff/landing
touchdown zones; repair RQC in these zones are most restrictive).
Boxed‐in MOS, one that has large craters situated at the ends that limit expansion
potential.
Craters in either an aircraft arresting system's cable approach or fixed tape sweep.
Only one access route with no potential of developing a second route.

Figure 21. Undesirable Minimum Operating Strip Selection Aspects
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Appendix G. Enlisted Civil Engineer Evaluation Protocol

In Table 12 and Table 13 (below), triennial Silver Flag airfield damage
assessment exercise data has been provided. This data set includes the performance of
five separate teams, evaluating the one-and-one-quarter mile practice runway, located at
the Contiguous United States, Contingency Training site, Panama City, Florida. Each
team assessed the same configuration of pavement damage and mock explosive hazards
under similar environmental and climatological conditions. Each team consisted of one
(x1) non-specific enlisted civil engineer specialties: one (x1) enlisted Engineering
Assistant (‘EA’); and two (x2) enlisted Explosive Ordnance Disposal (‘EOD Techs’).
The skill levels of the airmen evaluated ranged between three (novice) and seven (expert)
levels. Each team was equipped with a six-passenger, light-duty pickup truck, a landmobile-radio (LMR; with signal booster), and a scaled airfield map. Three of the five
teams conducted their Airfield Damage Assessment Team (ADAT) exercise on August
10, 2017, and two teams completed their exercise during their encampment on September
28, 2017. Both of these evaluation periods have been tabulated in Table 12. Similarly, a
third evaluation period – consisting of four teams – was conducted on December 12,
2017 (Table 13). Throughout the duration of the exercises, each team was evaluated by a
seven-level cadre member of their corresponding specialty.
Table 12 (below) shows eight (x8) total objects; two craters (C), two spall fields
(S), three UXOs (X), and one bomblet field (B). Table 7 (below) shows seven (x7) total
objects; one spall field (S), two craters (C), and four UXOs (X). Column A (“Item #”)
identifies which item the team is acknowledging. Column B (‘Team”) identifies which
96

team identified which item. Subsequent columns within that row record that team’s
performance identifying, quantifying, and qualifying the object of interest. Column C
(“Type”) refers to what the object is identified as; ‘C’ indicates a crater, ‘S’ indicates a
spall field, ‘X’ indicates a UXO, and ‘B’ indicates a bomblet field. Column D (“CL
Dist.”) indicates the distance (measured in feet) along the centerline – from a
predetermined datum – that the team locates the damage to begin. Correspondingly,
Column J denotes where the damage or object terminates along the centerline. Column E
(“L/R”) denotes whether the damage or object is to-the-left or t- the-right of the
centerline. Column F (“Distance L/R”) indicates the distance (measured in feet) the
object or damage begins to-the-left or -right of the centerline. Column G (“D/W”) is a
quantifier, that specifies whether the damage or object is being measured as a ‘diameter’
(typically a crater), or as a ’width’ (spalls and bomblet fields). Column H (“Size D/W”)
is the associated measurement (in feet) for the input to the previous column (G). Column
I (‘Field”) is populated if the damage is a ‘field’ (e.g., spall fields and bomblet fields).
Columns J through N are a repeat of previous columns. Their purpose is to quantify the
termination of the damage and/or explosive hazards. Column O (“Single/Multi”) serves a
similar purpose as Column I in that it is populated when there are numerous objects (e.g.,
pits and blemishes as per a spall field or bomblets and sub-munitions as per a bomblet
field). Column P (“Qty”) corresponds to the approximate number of blemishes or submunitions present within that spall- or bomblet-field. Lastly, Column Q (“Description”)
is a write-in qualifier for teams to provide additional clarification of their findings. Note:
in row associated with the item number, the bold text indicates the solution (correct
answer) for each item. The airfield damage items were recorded using the Pavement
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Reference Marking System (PRMS) that is native to the EA career field. Noncorrespondingly, all explosive hazards were recorded using the Military Grid Reference
System (MGRS). At the time of the evaluations, the answer keys were not shared among
evaluators. As such, only the pavement damage (PRMS) items – 1, 5, 6, and 7 – have a
known solution. Due to the exclusion of a solution set for the explosive hazards, the
positive identification (or lack thereof) of the object will be the primary concern (note:
the assessment methodology was amended in the December evaluations) a secondary
metric will be the relative placement and quantification recorded across each of the nine
teams – essentially, how precise are they as a collective, relative to one another.
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Table 12. Enlisted Civil Engineer Exercise Results (Baseline; 1 of 2)
Data Set #1: Five, 4‐Pers Teams, Two Separate Evaluation Periods (Aug 2017 & Oct 2017)
Item No. Team Type CL Dist ‐ Start L/R Dist L/R D/W Size D/W Field CL Dist ‐ Stop L/R Dist L/R D/W Size D/W Single/Multi Qty
1
1
2
3
4
5
2
1
2
3
4
5
3
1
2
3
4
5
4
1
2
3
4
5
5
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
7
1
2
3
4
5
8
1
2
3
4
5

S
S
0
C
S
0
X
X
X
X
X
X
B
B
B
B
B
B
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
C
C
‐‐
C
C
S
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
S
C
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
C
C
X
X
X
‐‐
X
X

5450
5400
‐‐
5450
5450
‐‐
5000
5050
5100
4650
5100
5100
4850
4825
4850
4820
4950
4850
4250
4325
4300
4200
4300
4320
3875
3300
3300
‐‐
3900
3900
3555
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
3550
3275
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
3250
3280
3250
3300
3300
‐‐
3250
3280

R
R
‐‐
R
R
‐‐
L
L
L
L
L
L
R
R
R
R
R
R
L
L
L
L
L
L
R
L
L
‐‐
‐‐
R
L
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
L
R
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
R
L
L
L
L
‐‐
L
L

45
65
‐‐
100
45
‐‐
30
35
30
32
30
30
50
60
45
50
50
60
30
30
30
30
30
30
0
0
0
‐‐
‐‐
0
30
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
30
0
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
10
10
10
0
15
‐‐
2
10

Description

W
W
‐‐
W
W
‐‐

40
30
‐‐
30
45
‐‐

F
F
‐‐
F
F
‐‐

5550
5560
‐‐
5550
5550
‐‐

R
R
‐‐
L
R
‐‐

45
30
‐‐
20
45
‐‐

W
45
M
150
W
30
M
40
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
W
30
M
50
W
45
M
150
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
<<< No Values Provided ‐ Assumed/Based on Mean Team Performance

W
W
W
W
W
W

30
30
20
10
30
30

F
F
F
F
F
F

4850
4850
4900
4835
4800
4800

R
R
R
R
R
R

40
30
45
40
50
40

W
30
M
15
<<< No Val ‐ Assumed
W
60
M
20
W
15
M
15
W
10
M
8
W
30
M
20
W
30
M
10
<<< No Values Provided ‐ Assumed/Based on Mean Team Performance

D
D
D
‐‐
D
D
W
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
W
D
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
D
D

50
20
60
‐‐
45
40
5
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
10
50
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
45
50

F
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
F

3520
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
3500

L
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
R

30
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
30

W
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
W

5
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
10

M
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
M

2
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
2

<<< No Values Provided ‐ Assumed/Based on Mean Team Performance
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Table 13. Enlisted Civil Engineer Exercise Results (Baseline; 2 of 2)
Data Set #2: Four, 4‐Pers Teams, One Evaluation Period (Dec 2017)
Item No. Team Type CL Dist ‐ Start L/R Dist L/R D/W Size D/W Field CL Dist ‐ Stop L/R Dist L/R D/W Size D/W Single/Multi Qty
1
1
2
3
4
2
1
2
3
4
3
1
2
3
4
4
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
6
1
2
3
4
7
1
2
3
4
8
1
2
3
4

X
X
X
X
X
S
B
S
S
B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
C
‐‐
‐‐
C
X
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
C
C
‐‐
C
C
X
X
X
X
X

5230
5200
5200
5220
5200
5450
5550
5500
5575
5550
4840
4850
4800
4825
4825
4584
4550
4575
4580
4630
3875
3850
‐‐
‐‐
3920
3661
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
3270
3250
‐‐
3100
3260
3270
3300
3275
3250
3280

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
L
L
L
L
L
R
R
R
R
R
R
L
‐‐
‐‐
L
R
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
L
L
‐‐
L
L
L
R
R
R
R

75
75
75
75
20
45
40
50
20
30
40
25
25
25
20
30
40
40
40
20
0
0
‐‐
‐‐
0
50
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
‐‐
0
0
‐‐
0
0
0
15
20
35
30

Description
16RFU 44797 22644

W
W
W
W
W

40
15
20
20
10

F
F
F
F
F

5550
5500
5550
5450
5560

R
R
R
R
R

45
45
60
20
30

W
W
W
W
W

45
10
25
20
10

M
M
M
M
M

150
9
9
15
10
16R FU 44764 22524

16RFU4478722447

D
D
‐‐
‐‐
D

50
50
‐‐
‐‐
40
16R FU 44800 22166

D
D
‐‐
D
D

50
75
‐‐
40
50
16R FU 44788 22047

Table 14. Comparison of Location Precision Among Nine Enlisted Civil Engineer
Teams

CL precision
L/R precision
W/D precision

Comparison Across Nine Teams
Average Difference From True (ft)
Average Difference From True (m)
72.0
21.9
10.2
3.1
7.2
2.2

Order of Magnitude (vs. GPS)
2.19
0.31
0.22

Table 15. Location Accuracy Among Nine Enlisted Civil Engineer Teams
Comparison of Average Team Performance (vs. Commercial GPS Performance)
Order of Magnitude (vs. GPS)
Average Difference From True (ft)
Average Difference From True (m)
CL accuracy
28.4
2.84
93.21
L/R accuracy
5.1
0.51
16.67
W/D accuracy
3.2
0.32
10.36
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Appendix H. Civil Engineer Officer Evaluation Protocol

1. Open the GUI titled ‘MAIN.m’ by double left-clicking the icon in the file folder
a.

The MATLAB™ application will open with MAIN.m open as the primary script

Figure 22. Step 1.a. - Open MAIN.m

b. Under the “EDITOR” ribbon, single left-click “Run”
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Figure 23. Step 1.b. - Run MAIN.m

c. A blank GUI will populate – minimize it and return to the MATLAB™
screen

Figure 24. Step 1.c. - Blank GUI Screen

2. In the “Current Folder” pane, select the “pave_scout_master” file by single rightclicking
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a. In the menu that appears, hover your cursor over “Add to Path”, then leftclick to select “Selected Folders and Subfolders”

Figure 25. Step 2. - Adding Folders to Path

3. Repeat this process for the files “zoharby-plot_google_map-08b192d” and
“flight2”
4. In the Current Folder pane, left-click the expand icon to the right of “flight2”
a. Double left-click “flight_2.mat” to load telemetry and image data
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Figure 26. Step 4. - Loading flight_2.mat

5. In the Current Folder pane, double left-click “analyzeFrames.m”
a. Under the “EDITOR” ribbon single left-click “Run”

Figure 27. Step 5. - Loading & Running analyzeFrames.m
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6. A new GUI will populate with the following options: “Previous Frame”, “Next
Frame”, “UXO”, “Crater”, “Generate Waypoints”, and “Locate MOS”
a. Single left-click “Next Frame” to display the first image

Figure 28. Step 6. - Properly Configured Graphical User Interface

7. Operators advance forward and backward through the images until objects are
detected
8. When an operator identifies a UXO, they single left-click “UXO”
a. In response, a new window with the same image appears
b. The operator then single left-clicks the UXO, specifies their estimate for
the UXO class – in a drop down menu that populates
c. Lastly, the operator either selects “Confirm Placement”, “Cancel
Placement”, or “Go Back” (to the previous screen) with a single left-click
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Figure 29. Step 8. - Identifying and Locating UXOs

9. The operator then continues his/her inspection
10. When a spall or crater is detected, the operator single left-clicks “Crater”
a. In response, a new window with the same image appears
b. The operator then single left-clicks a series of points around the edge of
the crater
c. The GUI will automatically place waypoints and connect them with lines
to form a polygon
i. A minimum of three points will be required to identify a crater
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d. When complete, the operator single left-clicks either “Confirm
Placement”, “Cancel Last Pt” (to remove an erroneous waypoint), or “Go
Back” (to navigate back to the previous screen) with a single left-click

Figure 30. Step 10. - Identifying & Locating Spalls & Craters

11. The operator then continues his/her inspection until all images have been
analyzed
a. At this point, the operator then single left-clicks “Generate Waypoints” to
produce a waypoint file to be ingested (using Python™) into
MissionPlanner™
b. Before the waypoints are generated, the script will ask the operator to
specify the altitude with which the hexa-copter will be flown
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i. The operator will specify 20 [meters]

Figure 31. Step 11.b.i. - Specifying the altitude for multi-rotor inspection

12. Finally, the operator will single left-click “Locate MOS”
a. A figure will appear with the Aircraft landing requirements – depicted in
the form of a rectangle – superimposed on a Google Earth™ image of the
airfield surface
b. Evaluation of the civil engineer officer operator will be complete when the
MOS is identified on the airfield surface
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Figure 32. Step 12. - Waypoints and MOS Outputs
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Appendix I. Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Components

Equipment
FrSky Taranis Radio Controller. The FrSky Tranis X9D™ radio (Figure 33.
FrSky Taranis X9D Radio Transmitter) is a powerful controller favored by many RC
SUAS enthusiasts. This transmitter operates on a 2.4 gigahertz frequency and offers up
to 16 channels. Additional features include: audio speech outputs (values, alarms, mode
settings, etc.), real-time flight data logging receiver signal strength indicator, and super
low latency and vibration alerts. This device weighs eight pounds and is widely available
in hobbyist stores as well as in online retailers.

Figure 33. FrSky Taranis X9D Radio Transmitter
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Sony High Definition, Color Block Camera. The Sony FCB-EV7100 camera
(shown in Figure 34 is a 1/2.8 type Exmor CMOS image sensor with full HD
(1920x1080) at 60 fps and 10x optical zoom. It features a wide-dynamic range, auto
Infrared Cutfilter Removal (ICR), and a compact design (Sony Corporation of America,
2017a).

Figure 34. Sony High Definition Color Block Camera (FCB-EV7100)

CONNEX HD Wireless Video Receiver. The Amimon CONNEX HD (Figure
35) is a 5.8-GHz, wireless video receiver/transmitter that is cable of providing live/nearzero latency, feed from an SUAS imaging platform. This receiver allows up to 1080p
resolution at 60 frames per second. The basic system features a range of up to 3,300 feet
(line-of-sight), can display data from telemetry modules, and supports encrypted video
transmission.
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Figure 35. Amimon CONNEX HD Wireless Video Transmitter/Receiver

AV.io video capture card. The Av.io 4k video capture card (shown in Figure
36) – Epiphan Systems Inc. – is a rugged HD video and audio capture card capable of
producing an image resolution of 4096x2160, with 4K UHD video streaming at 30 fps
and 1080p at 60fps. In addition, this card pushes PCM audio over HDMITM at up to 24bit, 96kHz via two-channel stereo audio outputs, complete with automatic resampling at
48kHz and 16-bit encoding. Lastly, this device captures video and audio with, at most,
one to two frames of latency, thus providing a seamless, real-time airfield survey
(Epiphan Systems Inc., 2017).
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Figure 36. Epiphan Av.io 4k Video Capture Card

The purpose of the AV.io 4K card is to collect the live video feed from the Sony
Block Camera/ Skywalker and stream it to the GCS in real-time. In Figure 37, the
Survey Phase system configuration is shown. Starting with the Sony FCB-EV7100
Block Camera, a live video is fed through an iShot® HDMI™ interface board and ported
into a Connex HD video transmitter (Amimon Ltd., 2016). The feed is then channeled
across a 5.1-5.8 GHz radio frequency to the Connex receiver located at the GCS. The
Connex receiver then ports HDMI™ into the AV.io 4K capture card which is then
connected via a universal serial bus 3.0 into the GCS which is running the custom
MATLABTM script (Allen, 2017).
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Figure 37. Skywalker Imaging System Configuration

Sony α6000 camera. The Sony α6000 (shown in Figure 38) is a mirrorless,
compact, E-mount, digital camera that boasts a 24.3-megapixel APS-C CMOS sensor and
diffraction-reducing image processor. It is capable of 11 frames-per-second continuous
shooting and subject-tracking as well as full HD video recording at 1080p/60p and 24p
(Sony Corporation of America, 2017). The base camera has been fitted with an E 20.4
millimeter, F2.8, “pancake” lens, which has a seven-blade circular aperture for rounded
defocusing and an aspherical lens that maintains high contrast and minimizes distortion
and flatness of the image pane; it has a compact design, faster autofocus response, and
reduced minimum focusing distances (Sony Corporation of America, 2017b).
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Figure 38. Sony α6000 Digital Camera & 2.8x20mm "Pancake" Lens

Storm Pro-3 gimbal. The Storm Pro-3 (shown in Figure 39Figure 39) is a
universal, three-axis, brushless gimbal that is mounted on the underside of the Tarot T960
frame. It provides 360 degrees of continuous pan axis movement and a self-contained
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) for stabilization; it can support any camera – including
smart phones – weighing 350 – 600 grams (Helipal, 2017a). This gimbal was included
such that atmospheric conditions (i.e., wind) would be mitigated during imaging
operations. In addition, while not utilized in the final configuration, the Storm Pro-3 is
capable of being linked to the Pixhawk 2.0 autopilot. This linkage allows for pinpoint
geo-locating accuracy and enhanced image stabilization during flight.
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Figure 39. Storm Pro-3, Universal Three Axis Gimbal

Pixhawk Autopilot. The Pixhawk™ 2.0 (shown in Figure 40) is an autopilot
developed by the Pixhawk open hardware community in 2017 (PX4 Autopilot, 2017). It
features “14 pulse width modulation/servo outputs”, connectivity options for peripherals,
an integrated backup system for in-flight recovery and manual override, multi-tone piezo
audio indicator, and microSD card. This autopilot operates on a 32-bit STM32F427
Cortex M4 core with FPU processor, “capable of 168 MHz, 256 kB Ram, 2 MB Flash,
and 32-bit failsafe co-processor” (PX4 Autopilot, 2017).
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Figure 40. Pixhawk 2.0
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Table 16. SUAS Equipment Cost Summary
Custom Hex-Rotor Components (www.Helipal.com)
Tarot™ T960 Foldable 6-Axis Hexa-copter Carbon Fiber Frame for FPV TL960A
Tarot™ T810/960 Landing Gear TL96013
Storm Pro-3, Three Axis, Universal Gimbal
1555 15x55 Carbon Fiber Propeller Props CW/CCW for DJI S800 Octocopter Multirotor (pair)
KDE4215XF-465 Brushless Motor for Heavy-Lift Electric Multi-Rotor (SUAS) Series
KDEXF-UAS95HVC 95A+HV Electronic Speed Controller (ESC) for Electric Multi-Rotor (UAS) Series
Multistar Hi-Capacity 22,000mAh Lithium-Polymer Battery
Turnigy Bolt V2 850mAh 3S 130C High Voltage Lithium Polymer Battery
Sony a6000 Camera
Sony SEL-20F28 E-Mount 20mm F2.8 Prime Fixed Lens
Pixhawk 2.0 & GNSS Kit
FrSky Taranis X9d+ Transmitter
Lenovo ThinkPad T470 (example ground control station)
Fasteners, Retaining Straps, Adhesives, and Other

Quantity Unit Price
1
$ 349.99
1
$
74.90
1
$ 599.00
6
$
15.12
6
$ 148.95
6
$ 195.95
2
$ 145.92
1
$
9.99
1
$ 649.99
1
$ 348.00
1
$ 309.39
1
$ 279.00
1
$ 979.00
1
$ 100.00
Hex-Rotor Total:

Off-the-Shelf Multi-Rotor (approx $2,500 assembly fee; www.rc-drones.com)
DJI Spread Wings S800 (excludes: Gimbal, Batteries, Communications Equipment, & Imaging Device)
DJI Spread Wings S900 (excludes: Gimbal, Batteries, Communications Equipment, & Imaging Device)
DJI Spread Wings S1000+ (excludes: Gimbal, Batteries, Communications Equipment, & Imaging Device)
FreeFly CineStar 8 Octocopter (excludes: Gimbal Batteries, Communications Equipment, & Imaging Device)
Altavian R8700 Galaxy (includes Altavian ground control equipment & sensor)

Quantity
1
1
1
1
1

Custom Skywalker X8 Components (www.fpvmodel.com)
Skywalker X-8 'Flying Wing' FPV RC Plane,Black
Turnigy G46 Electronic Brushless Outrunner Motor670kv
13x4 Folding Pusher Propeller
Pixhawk 1.0 & GNSS Kit
Sony FCBEV7100 10x Zoom Full HD CMOS Block Camera
Custom Catapult Launcher
Epiphan AV.io 4K Capture Card for HD 1080p 60 fps and UHD 4K 30 fps
Amimon CONNEX Wireless HD Video Link Receiver for UAVs
Turnigy Bolt V2 850mAh 3S 130C High Voltage Lithium Polymer Battery
FrSky Taranis X9d+ Transmitter
Lenovo ThinkPad T470 (example ground control station)
Fasteners, Retaining Straps, Adhesives, and Other

Quantity Unit Price
1
$ 298.00
1
$
55.52
1
$
7.99
1
$ 216.57
1
$ 649.95
1
$ 2,000.00
$ 499.00
1
1
$ 1,930.09
2
$
9.99
1
$ 279.00
1
$ 979.00
1
$ 100.00
Skywalker Total:

Off-the-Shelf Multi-Rotor (approx $700-1000 assembly fee; www.uavsysteminternational.com &
www.altavian.com)
Skywalker 1800 (excludes: batteries, imaging device, & launcher)
Altavian F7200 AT Nova (includes Altavian ground control equipment & sensor)
Altavian F7200 AE Nova (includes Altavian ground control equipment & sensor)
MD Group 1400mm FPV Sky Surfer (excludes: batteries, imaging device, & launcher)

Quantity Unit Price
1
1
1
1

$ 999.95
$15,180.00
$19,260.00
$ 1,100.00

Altavian Off-the-Shelf Ground Stations & Sensor Packages (www.altavian.com)
Altavian Flare Ground Control Station GS20, Software, & 12 Mos Updates
Altavian Flare GS10 Radio Module
Altavian Flare Software and Updates
Altavain Fusion Modular Sensor Package MP22 CV20SVN

Quantity
1
1
1
1

Unit Price
$ 5,950.00
$ 1,370.00
$ 260.00
$ 5,550.00

Software
Mission Planner™.
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$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Sub-Total
349.99
74.90
599.00
45.36
893.70
1,175.70
291.84
9.99
649.99
348.00
309.39
279.00
979.00
100.00
6,105.86

Unit Price Estimated Total
$ 3,399.00 $
6,965.21
$ 3,699.00 $
7,265.21
$ 3,999.00 $
7,565.21
$ 4,409.00 $
7,376.21
$15,100.00 $
28,230.00

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Sub-Total
298.00
55.52
7.99
216.57
649.95
2,000.00
499.00
1,930.09
19.98
278.00
979.00
100.00
7,034.10

Estimated Total
$
$
$
$

7,455.97
28,310.00
32,390.00
7,556.02

The Mission Planner (MP) is a donation-based, open source, hobbyist drone
software, developed by Michael Osborne of the ArduPilot™ development team in 2010
(ArduPilot Development Team, 2016). The MP Graphic User Interface (GUI) provides a
host of features including flight data, flight planning, configuration and tuning,
simulations, telemetry logging, geo-tagging, remote camera triggering, and more. In this
thesis approach, MP was used for both the Skywalker X8 and the Tarot 960. MP was
leveraged to store tuning presets for each air vehicle, as well as mission parameters
(waypoints), which could be rapidly updated and ported to the air vehicle Auto Pilot
(Pixhawk 2.0), both on the ground, as well as in-flight. Lastly, MP was used to collect
telemetry data and remotely trigger the Tarot 960 Sony α6000, as well as provide current
air vehicle status and information during flying operations.
Simple BGC.
The Simple BGC software, version 2.40b (BaseCam Electronics, 2017) is a GUI
designed to tune the Storm Pro-3 gimbal. This GUI enables users to push firmware
updates to the gimbal as well as calibrate the accelerometer and gyroscope for IMU
accuracy. Lastly, this GUI enables operators to push configuration settings to the
gimbal’s motherboard to optimize performance. Within the context of the research, the
GUI was used to lock down the yaw (pan) axis of the gimbal, such that the camera would
rotate in unison with the air vehicle during maneuvering. This differed from a two-axis
gimbal in that, should the drone experience rough air or sudden course correction, the
yaw-axis would serve as a dampener, thus preserving image stability.
MATLAB™ R2016a.
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MATLAB is a proprietary numerical computing environment and programming
language that was developed by Cleve Moler, chairman of the computer science
department at the University of New Mexico, as an alternative to his students having to
learn Fortran in 1984 (The MathWorks Inc., 2017). Now, presently owned and licensed
by The MathWorks Inc., MATLAB allows programmers to produce matrix
manipulations, plot, develop algorithms, and create custom GUIs for interfacing with
programs written in other languages such as Python, Fortran, Java, C, C++ and C#.
MATLAB was used in this thesis to develop a custom GUI with which Google
Earth™ satellite imagery, MP telemetry logs, and aerial imagery could be used to
produce a constellation of geo-located markers (“pins”). The end-product used
predetermined aircraft takeoff requirements – graphically displayed as a rectangle in the
scale of the satellite image – and particle swarm analysis to optimize the positioning of a
MOS with respect to identified craters, spalls, and UXOs. Finally, the ML GUI
leveraged a Python™ script to push the finalized waypoints back into MP for the Tarot
960 to navigate for final imaging.
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Pix4D™. Pix4D mapper (version 3.3) is “photogrammetry software for
professional drone-based mapping, purely from images” produced either through a
mobile-, desktop-, or cloud-based system (Pix4D, 2017). Founded in 2011, Pix4D is a
clone of École Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL) developed in Switzerland.
The software produces a dense 3D point cloud via overlapping images. Capabilities
include digital surface and terrain modeling, ortho-mosaic (high resolution, geo-located
mapping devoid of perspective distortions), volume calculations, contour lines (i.e.,
topographic surveys), 3D textured modeling, and thermography (radio-metrically
accurate mapping with temperature values for each pixel).
The developers’ website lists the following applications of the Pix4D software:
mining, 2D and 3D mapping, and forensics. The software is also advertised to support
the following industries: surveying (mapping, mining, forensics), construction
(earthwork, Building Information Modeling, inspection), agriculture, and real estate.
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Appendix J. Civil Engineer Officer MATLAB™ & 2D Ortho-mosaic Results

2.a.i. Positive Identification of Damage/FOD; Road Flares

2.a.ii. Positive Identification of Damage/FOD; Pool

2.a.iii. Positive Identification of Damage/FOD; Beach Towel

2.a.iv. Positive Identification of Damage/FOD; Zoo Map

2.a.ix. False Positives ‐ FOD

2.a.x. False Negatives ‐ FOD

2.b.i. Positive Identification of Hazards; Mortar 1

2.b.i. Positive Identification of Hazards; Mortar 2

2.b.iii. Positive Identification of Hazards; Mortar 3

2.b.iv. Positive Identification of Hazards; Mortar 4

2.b.v. False Positives ‐ UXO

2.b.vi. False Negatives ‐ UXO

Total Objects Correctly Identified

Total Objects False Positive

Total Objects False Negative

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

126
100
130
153
217
283
134
199
204
321
327
335
212
172
276
229
170
310
375
137
263
130
164
332
248

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
2
7
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
3
0

1
1
1
3
1
3
3
3
2
0
2
0
2
2
0
0
1
1
0
2
1
1
0
2
0

1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
2
2
8
4
1
1
0
2
1
1
0
0
4
2
0
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
2

1
2
2
3
3
4
4
4
4
2
4
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
4
4
4
4
3
4

6
5
5
2
4
1
1
1
2
6
2
5
2
2
4
4
3
3
6
2
3
3
4
3
4

0
0
2
2
10
4
1
1
0
3
3
8
1
0
5
3
0
4
2
0
1
0
1
3
2

2
3
3
6
4
7
7
7
6
2
6
3
6
6
4
4
5
5
2
6
5
5
4
5
4

216.88
95.00
370.00
275.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

5.00
5.00
5.00
0.00

221.88
100.00
375.00
275.00

0.44
0.00
1.00
1.00

0.96
0.00
1.00
1.00

0.84
0.00
1.00
1.00

0.48
0.00
1.00
1.00

0.84
0.00
7.00
7.00

1.28
0.00
3.00
3.00

0.24
0.00
1.00
1.00

0.20
0.00
1.00
1.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.16
0.00
1.00
1.00

1.40
0.00
8.00
8.00

3.40
1.00
4.00
3.00

3.32
1.00
6.00
5.00

2.24
0.00
10.00
10.00

4.68
2.00
7.00
5.00
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2.b. Accuracy of Identifying Explosive Hazards

1.d. Time to Produce MOS/MAOS

121
95
125
148
212
278
129
194
199
316
322
330
207
167
271
224
165
305
370
132
258
125
159
327
243

2.a. Accuracy of Identifying Damage & FOD

1.c. Time to Plot Damage

Subject 1
Subject 2
Subject 3
Subject 4
Subject 5
Subject 6
Subject 7
Subject 8
Subject 9
Subject 10
Subject 11
Subject 12
Subject 13
Subject 14
Subject 15
Subject 16
Subject 17
Subject 18
Subject 19
Subject 20
Subject 21
Subject 22
Subject 23
Subject 24
Subject 25
AVG
MIN
MAX
RANGE

1.b. Time to Assess(seconds)

1.a. Time to Respond

Table 17. Civil Engineer Officer Responses - MATLAB Graphic User Interface

2.a.i. Positive Identification of Damage/FOD; Road Flares

2.a.ii. Positive Identification of Damage/FOD; Pool

2.a.iii. Positive Identification of Damage/FOD; Beach Towel

2.a.iv. Positive Identification of Damage/FOD; Zoo Map

2.a.ix. False Positives ‐ FOD

2.a.x. False Negatives ‐ FOD

2.b.i. Positive Identification of Hazards; Mortar 1

2.b.i. Positive Identification of Hazards; Mortar 2

2.b.iii. Positive Identification of Hazards; Mortar 3

2.b.iv. Positive Identification of Hazards; Mortar 4

2.b.v. False Positives ‐ UXO

2.b.vi. False Negatives ‐ UXO

Total Objects Correctly Identified

Total Objects False Positive

Total Objects False Negative

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

103
66
96
102
326
196
353
151
239
235
236
280
185
195
279
233
359
227
247
130
258
73
106
605
328

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
1
0
1
0
6
0
1
0
1
9
6
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
6
8

1
1
1
1
0
1
2
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0

1
0
0
0
3
5
3
1
4
2
3
0
1
0
2
3
6
2
2
1
2
0
1
0
2

1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
2

6
6
4
6
7
6
5
6
6
7
6
7
6
5
7
6
7
7
7
6
7
3
6
7
5

1
0
1
0
4
5
9
1
5
2
4
9
7
0
4
3
6
3
2
1
2
0
1
6
10

2
2
4
2
1
2
3
2
2
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
5
2
1
3

219.32
61.00
600.00
539.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

5.00
5.00
5.00
0.00

224.32
66.00
605.00
539.00

0.32
0.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

0.96
0.00
1.00
1.00

1.68
0.00
9.00
9.00

0.72
0.00
2.00
2.00

0.96
0.00
1.00
1.00

0.88
0.00
1.00
1.00

0.04
0.00
1.00
1.00

0.88
0.00
1.00
1.00

1.76
0.00
6.00
6.00

1.24
0.00
4.00
4.00

6.04
3.00
7.00
4.00

3.44
0.00
10.00
10.00

1.96
1.00
5.00
4.00
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2.b. Accuracy of Identifying Explosive Hazards

1.d. Time to Produce MOS/MAOS

98
61
91
97
321
191
348
146
234
230
231
275
180
190
274
228
354
222
242
125
253
68
101
600
323

2.a. Accuracy of Identifying Damage & FOD

1.c. Time to Plot Damage

Subject 1
Subject 2
Subject 3
Subject 4
Subject 5
Subject 6
Subject 7
Subject 8
Subject 9
Subject 10
Subject 11
Subject 12
Subject 13
Subject 14
Subject 15
Subject 16
Subject 17
Subject 18
Subject 19
Subject 20
Subject 21
Subject 22
Subject 23
Subject 24
Subject 25
AVG
MIN
MAX
RANGE

1.b. Time to Assess(seconds)

1.a. Time to Respond

Table 18. Civil Engineer Officer Responses - 2D Ortho-mosaic Interface

Appendix K. Baseline Metrics and Civil Engineer Officer Statistics

Table 19. Descriptive Statistics for Object False Negatives in the Baseline Metrics
Teams 1‐5: Pure Object False
Negative Detection Rate
Mean
0.275
Standard Error
0.071499507
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.452202587
Sample Variance
0.204487179
Kurtosis
‐0.95301373
Skewness
1.047504425
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
11
Count
40
27.50%

Teams 6‐9: Pure Object False
Negative Detection Rate
Mean
0.107142857
Standard Error
0.05952381
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.314970394
Sample Variance
0.099206349
Kurtosis
5.613784615
Skewness
2.686455177
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
3
Count
28
10.71%

Combined: Pure Object False
Negative Detection Rate
Mean
0.205882353
Standard Error
0.049398594
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.407351238
Sample Variance
0.165935031
Kurtosis
0.219143819
Skewness
1.487808432
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
14
Count
68
20.59%

Table 20. Descriptive Statistics for Explosive Hazard False Negatives in Baseline
Metrics
Teams 1‐5: Explosive Hazard
False Negative Detection Rate
Mean
0.05
Standard Error
0.05
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.223606798
Sample Variance
0.05
Kurtosis
20
Skewness
4.472135955
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
1
Count
20
5.00%

Teams 6‐9: Explosive Hazard
False Negative Detection
Mean
0
Standard Error
0
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation
0
Sample Variance
0
Kurtosis
#DIV/0!
Skewness
#DIV/0!
Range
0
Minimum
0
Maximum
0
Sum
0
Count
16
0.00%
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Combined: Explosive Hazard
False Negative Detection
Mean
0.027778
Standard Error
0.027778
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.166667
Sample Variance
0.027778
Kurtosis
36
Skewness
6
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
1
Count
36
2.78%

Table 21. Descriptive Statistics for Explosive Hazard False Positives in Baseline
Metrics
Teams 1‐5: Explosive Hazard
False Positive Detection Rate
Mean
0
Standard Error
0
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation
0
Sample Variance
0
Kurtosis
#DIV/0!
Skewness
#DIV/0!
Range
0
Minimum
0
Maximum
0
Sum
0
Count
39
0.00%

Teams 6‐9: Explosive Hazard
False Positive Rate
Mean
0.071428571
Standard Error
0.049563476
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.262265264
Sample Variance
0.068783069
Kurtosis
11.18343195
Skewness
3.519630882
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
2
Count
28
7.14%

Combined: Explosive Hazard
False Positive Rate
Mean
0.029850746
Standard Error
0.020947148
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.171459798
Sample Variance
0.029398462
Kurtosis
30.87550296
Skewness
5.652816474
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
2
Count
67
2.99%

Table 22. Descriptive Statistics for Incorrect Object Identification in Baseline
Metrics
Teams 1‐5: Object Incorrect
Identification Rate
Mean
0.034482759
Standard Error
0.034482759
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.185695338
Sample Variance
0.034482759
Kurtosis
29
Skewness
5.385164807
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
1
Count
29
3.45%

Teams 6‐9: Object Incorrect
Identification Rate
Mean
0.08
Standard Error
0.055377492
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.276887462
Sample Variance
0.076666667
Kurtosis
9.640831758
Skewness
3.297525541
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
2
Count
25
8.00%
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Combined: Object Incorrect
Identification Rate
Mean
0.055555556
Standard Error
0.031464006
Median
0
Mode
0
Standard Deviation 0.231212282
Sample Variance
0.053459119
Kurtosis
14.47378227
Skewness
3.992335155
Range
1
Minimum
0
Maximum
1
Sum
3
Count
54
5.56%

Table 23. Civil Engineer Officer Object False Negative Detection Statistics

2D 1-25: Pure Object False Negative
MATLAB 1-25: Pure Object False
Detection Rate
Negative Detection Rate
Mean
1.96
Mean
4.68
Standard Error
0.2039608
Standard Error
0.31475
Median
2
Median
5
Mode
2
Mode
6
Standard Deviation
1.0198039
Standard Deviation
1.57374
Alpha
0.05
Alpha
0.05
Ho: Avg New Method <=
0.2059
Ho: Avg New Method <= 0.2059
Ha: Avg New Method >
0.2059
Ha: Avg New Method >
0.2059
Range
4
Range
5
Minimum
1
Minimum
2
Maximum
5
Maximum
7
Sum
49
Sum
117
Count (n)
25
Count (n)
25
Degrees of Freedom
24.00
Degrees of Freedom
24.00
t-Statistic
4.610
t-Statistic
9.869
p-Value
1.000
p-Value
1.000
Critical Value
-1.711
Critical Value
-1.711
Goal: find evidence suggesting that the average number of false negative detection for
the new method is equal-to or less-than the status quo
2D Ortho-mosaic: T-Stat (4.610) > Critical Value (-1.711); therefore, Reject Ho
MATLAB T-Stat (9.869) > Critical Value (-1.711); therefore, Reject Ho
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Table 24. Civil Engineer Officer Explosive Hazard False Positive Statistics

2D 1-25: Explosive Hazard False
MATLAB 1-25: Explosive Hazard
Positive Detection Rate
False Positive Detection Rate
Mean
3.44
Mean
2.24
Standard Error
0.60575
Standard Error
0.50425
Median
3
Median
2
Mode
1
Mode
0
Standard Deviation
3.02875
Standard Deviation
2.52124
Ho: Avg New Method <= 0.0299
Ho: Avg New Method <= 0.0299
Ha: Avg New Method >
0.0299
Ha: Avg New Method >
0.0299
Range
10
Range
10
Minimum
0
Minimum
0
Maximum
10
Maximum
10
Sum
86
Sum
56
Count (n)
25
Count (n)
25
Degrees of Freedom
24
Degrees of Freedom
24
t-Statistic
0.679
t-Statistic
-0.558
p-Value
0.748
p-Value
0.291
Critical Value
-1.976
Critical Value
-1.976
Goal: find evidence suggesting that the average number of false negatives for the
new method is equal-to or less-than the status quo
2D Ortho-mosaic: T-Stat (0.679) > Critical Value (-1.976); therefore, Reject Ho
MATLAB T-Stat (-0.558) > Critical Value (-1.976); therefore, Reject Ho
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Table 25. Civil Engineer Officer Incorrect Identification Statistics

MATLAB 1-25: Object Incorrect
Identification Rate
Mean
4.68
Mean
1.96
Standard Error
0.31475
Standard Error
0.203961
Median
3
Median
6
Mode
2
Mode
6
Standard Deviation
1.57374
Standard Deviation
1.019804
Ho: Avg New Method <=
Ho: Avg New Method <=
0.0556
0.0556
Ha: Avg New Method >
Ha: Avg New Method >
0.0556
0.0556
Range
5
Range
4
Minimum
1
Minimum
3
Maximum
6
Maximum
7
Sum
83
Sum
151
Count (n)
25
Count (n)
25
Degrees of Freedom
24.00
Degrees of Freedom
24.00
t-Statistic
4.610
t-Statistic
9.869
p-Value
1.000
p-Value
1.000
Critical Value
-1.654
Critical Value
-1.654
Goal: find evidence suggesting that the average number of incorrectly identified
objects for the new method is equal-to or less-than the status quo
2D Ortho-mosaic: T-Stat (4.610) > Critical Value (-1.654); therefore, Reject Ho
MATLAB T-Stat (9.869) > Critical Value (-1.654); therefore, Reject Ho
2D 1-25: Object Incorrect
Identification Rate
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Table 26. Summary Statistics (Baseline vs. Civil Engineer Officers)
Maximum Assessment Time (217 Meter Sample)
seconds
minutes
3EXXX Baseline Metric (Conventional Approach)
194
3.2
32EXX MATLAB GUI (1080p Video Capture)
370
6.2
32EXX 2D Ortho-Mosaic (24MP Still Imagery)
354
5.9
Minimum Assessment Time (217 Meter Sample)
seconds
minutes
3EXXX Baseline Metric (Conventional Approach)
129
2.2
32EXX MATLAB GUI (1080p Video Capture)
95
1.6
32EXX 2D Ortho-Mosaic (24MP Still Imagery)
61
1.0
Mean Assessment Time (217 Meter Sample)
seconds
minutes
3EXXX Baseline Metric (Conventional Approach)
162
2.7
32EXX MATLAB GUI (1080p Video Capture)
216.88
3.6
32EXX 2D Ortho-Mosaic (24MP Still Imagery)
203.45
3.4

sec/linear-meter
0.89
1.71
1.63
sec/linear-meter
0.59
0.44
0.28
sec/linear-meter
0.75
1.00
0.94

False Negative UXO Reports
Qty Objects Identified Total Objects %UXO False Negative
3EXXX Baseline Metric (Conventional Approach)
35
36
2.8%
32EXX MATLAB GUI (1080p Video Capture)
15
100
85.0%
32EXX 2D Ortho-Mosaic (24MP Still Imagery)
31
100
69.0%
False Negative FOD Reports
Qty Objects Identified Total Objects %UXO False Negative
3EXXX Baseline Metric (Conventional Approach)
---32EXX MATLAB GUI (1080p Video Capture)
68
100
32.0%
32EXX 2D Ortho-Mosaic (24MP Still Imagery)
18
100
82.0%
Overall False Negative Reports
Qty Objects Identified Total Objects %UXO False Negative
3EXXX Baseline Metric (Conventional Approach)
35
36
2.8%
32EXX MATLAB GUI (1080p Video Capture)
83
200
58.5%
32EXX 2D Ortho-Mosaic (24MP Still Imagery)
49
200
24.5%
T-Statistic
3EXXX Baseline Metric (Conventional Approach)
32EXX MATLAB GUI (1080p Video Capture)
32EXX 2D Ortho-Mosaic (24MP Still Imagery)
Pearson Correlation

17.25
13.14
9.17

3EXXX Baseline Metric (Conventional Approach)
32EXX MATLAB GUI (1080p Video Capture)
32EXX 2D Ortho-Mosaic (24MP Still Imagery)

-0.833
-0.094
-0.434
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Table 27. AFIT SUAS 217m Airfield Assessment Times & 3000m Extrapolation
Skywalker X8
Phase I - Setup

Unpack & Assemble Air Vehicle
Unpack & Assemble Catapult
Unpack & Assemble Ground Station
System Check Air Vehicle
Load Parameters & Mission Plan
Phase II - Mission Launch/Achieve Stable Flight
Fly Mission Plan (Altitude = 40m, Airspeed = 15m/s)
Recover
Phase III - Analyze Load Frame Pairs
Analyze
Generate Waypoints
Locate MOS
Total (seconds):
Total (minutes - 217m):
Approximate Total (minutes - 3,000m):
Tarot Hex-Rotor
Phase I - Setup

Unpack & Assemble Air Vehicle
System Check Air Vehicle
Load Parameters & Mission Plan
Phase II - Mission Launch/Achieve Stable Flight
Fly Mission Plan (Altitude = 80m, Airspeed = 10m/s*)
Recover
Phase III - Analyze Process Images
Analyze
Locate MOS
Total (seconds):
Total (minutes - 217m):
Approximate Total (minutes - 3,000m):

Time (sec)

718.2

45
135
30
5
216.9
1
3
1119.1
18.7
93.8

Varies based on internet connection
Manpower: x4

Time (sec)
309
42
153
30
840
203.5
3
1550.5
25.8
102.0

Personnel
Description
x1 Tech
x2 Tech
x1 GCS Op
x1 GCS Op, x1 Tech
x1 GCS Op
x1 Safey Pilot
x1 GCS Op, x1 Safety Pilot 217m sample (linear approx. 3,000m = 31.1 min)
x1 Safety Pilot
x1 GCS Op
x1 GCS Op
Avg. Subject analysis time (linear approx. 3,000m = 49.9 min)

Personnel
Description
x1 Tech
x1 GCS Op, x1 Tech
x1 GCS Op
x1 Safey Pilot
x1 GCS Op, x1 Safety Pilot 217m sample (linear approx. 3,000m = 35.2 min)
x1 Safey Pilot
x1 GCS Op
2D Pix4D output (3D = 18-min)
x1 GCS Op
Avg. Subject analysis time (linear approx. 3,000m = 46.88 min)
Assumes GUI built for Pix4D
Manpower: x3
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Appendix L. MAIN.m MATLAB™ Script

The following MATLAB script was written by Captain Timothy Allen in 2017.
This script serves as the foundation for the graphic user interface. All subsequent scripts,
commands, and inputs run through this script.
%% Initialize Variables
close all; clear; clc;
disp('Running Main Video GUI')
% Use global variables for shared info. Could use structure instead
global vidobj ginput_data target_data telemetry_data;
global LastTelemetry LastTime;
global Cam_Res cam_att;
global IP_ADDRESS PORT_NUMBER;
global frame_pairs current_frame_index;
% Initialize Arrays so function calls will work later
ginput_data = [];
target_data = [];
telemetry_data = [];
frame_pairs = cell(500,4);
LastTelemetry = [-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1]; % Initialized with dummy numbers
LastTime = -1;
current_frame_index = 1;
%% CONFIG ITEMS FOR USER INPUT
% Choose the IP Address for wherever this main file is called. If the
% python script and matlab script run on the same computer, use LocalHost,
% otherwise both the python script and matlab script need to use the
% network's IP address of the matlab computer.
IP_ADDRESS = 'LocalHost'; % Use for operation on same computer
%IP_ADDRESS = '192.168.1.134'; % IP Address of computer this script runs on
PORT_NUMBER = 5000;
% Arbitrary port number (match with .py script)
cam_att = [0 -62 0]; % Body-frame camera angles (Yaw Pitch Roll)
%% Instructions for working with GPS and UTM Coordinates
%[N,E,Zone,lcm]=ell2utm(GPS_origin(1),GPS_origin(2));
%UTM_origin = [N,E,Zone,lcm];
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%{
Take lat long in decimal degrees
Convert to radians
Convert to UTM coordinates (Cartesian Units of North and East)
Add or subtract meters north and east to find new UTM coordinates as needed
Convert new coordinates to ell GPS coordinates
Convert to new coordinates to degrees
Use final answer as needed (Plug into google maps for easy viewing)
%}
%% Set Camera & Hardware settings & values
% Create a video input object. Specify which camera device (2, in my case).
% Specify video format if multiple formats exist (I chose the highest
% resolution)
%vidobj = videoinput('winvideo',1,'YUY2_1920x1080');
%vidobj.ReturnedColorspace = 'rgb';
%vidInfo = propinfo(vidobj);
%Cam_Res = vidInfo.VideoResolution.DefaultValue;
%% Create Video GUI
% Create a figure window. This example turns off the default
% toolbar and menubar in the figure.
hFig = figure('Toolbar','none',...
'Menubar', 'none',...
'NumberTitle','Off',...
'Name','My Custom Preview GUI');
% Change the size of the GUI and placement in window as desired.
% set(gcf,'units','normalized','outerposition',[0 .04 1 0.96]);
set(gcf,'units','normalized','outerposition',[0 .04 0.65 0.96]);
% Set up the push buttons:
% These buttons call the functions
uicontrol('String', 'Grab Frame',...
'Callback', @grabFrame,...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[0 0 0.15 .07]);
uicontrol('String', 'Analyze Frames',...
'Callback', @analyzeFrames,...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[.17 0 .15 .07]);
uicontrol('String', 'Close',...
'Callback', 'close(gcf)',...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[0.34 0 .15 .07]);
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% Create the text label for any changing text. Not required
hTextLabel = uicontrol('style','text','String','Timestamp', ...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[0.6 0 .4 .08]);
% Create the image object in which you want to
% display the video preview data.
vidRes = vidobj.VideoResolution;
imWidth = vidRes(1);
imHeight = vidRes(2);
nBands = vidobj.NumberOfBands;
% Create handle for the video
hImage = subimage(zeros(imHeight,imWidth, nBands));
% Set up the update preview window function.
% NOTE: THIS IS WHAT ALLOWS FOR REAL TIME VIDEO
setappdata(hImage,'UpdatePreviewWindowFcn',@mypreview_fcn);
% Make handle to text label available to update function.
setappdata(hImage,'HandleToTimestampLabel',hTextLabel);
% Begins video playback
preview(vidobj, hImage);
% NOTE: This software requires the following unique toolboxes:
% Image Acquisition Toolbox
% Geodetic Tools (addon); % This must be downloaded
% Video drivers, etc.
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Appendix M. AnalyzeFrames.m MATLAB™ Script

The following MATLAB script was written by Captain Timothy Allen in 2017.
This script synthesizes the collected imagery and telemetry logs into a format allowing
user commands and resulting in a web-based output.

function analyzeFrames( hObject,callbackdata )
%analyzeFrames - allows user to select objects of interest from captured images.
global vidobj ginput_data target_data telemetry_data;
global LastTelemetry LastTime;
global Cam_Res cam_att;
global IP_ADDRESS PORT_NUMBER;
global frame_pairs current_frame_index;
global still_img craterList uxoList current_tele mos;
uxoList = {};
craterList = {};
frame_index = 0;
Cam_Res = [1920, 1080];%uncomment for test
%% Create Video GUI
% Create a figure window. This example turns off the default
% toolbar and menubar in the figure.
hFig = figure('Toolbar','none',...
'Menubar', 'none',...
'NumberTitle','Off',...
'Name','Images Captured from Video');
% Change the size of the GUI and placement in window as desired.
% set(gcf,'units','normalized','outerposition',[0 .04 1 0.96]);
set(gcf,'units','normalized','outerposition',[0 .04 0.65 0.96]);
% Set up the push buttons:
% These buttons call the functions
uicontrol('String', 'Previous Frame',...
'Callback', @prevFrame,...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[0 0 0.15 .07]);
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uicontrol('String', 'Next Frame',...
'Callback', @nextFrame,...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[0.17 0 .15 .07]);
uicontrol('String', 'UXO',...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[0.34 0 .15 .07],...
'Callback', @uxoGUI2);
uicontrol('String', 'Crater',...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[0.51 0 .15 .07],...
'Callback', @craterGUI2);
uicontrol('String', 'Generate Waypoints',...
'Callback', @exportWaypoints,...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[0.68 0 .15 .07]);
uicontrol('String', 'Locate MOS',...
'Units','normalized',...
'Position',[0.85 0 .15 .07],...
'Callback', @Afld_Opt);
function nextFrame(hObject, evt)
if ~isempty(frame_pairs{frame_index+1,1}) %There is another image
frame_index = frame_index + 1
still_img = frame_pairs{frame_index,1};
imshow(still_img)
current_tele = frame_pairs{frame_index,2};
end
end
function prevFrame(hObject, evt)
if frame_index - 1 > 0 % need to check bounds first
if ~isempty(frame_pairs{frame_index-1,1})
frame_index = frame_index - 1;
still_img = frame_pairs{frame_index,1};
imshow(still_img)
current_tele = frame_pairs{frame_index,2};
end
end
end
end
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Appendix N. Air Force Institute of Technology, SENG 651 Capstone Presentation
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